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SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW O. 
PAPPAS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS 
PURSUANT TO I.C. §§ 72-433 AND 
72-434 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW O. PAPPAS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO I.e. §§ 72-433 AND 72-434 - 1 
~'Ir; 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Matthew o. Pappas, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That the statements contained herein are your Affiant's own personal 
mind and are true and correct to the best of his information. 
2. That your Affiant is an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the 
state of Idaho and is a member of the law firm of Anderson, Julian & 
Hull LLP, attorneys for Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
3. That attached hereto is Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of 
correspondence from Dr. Craig Beaver dated July 20, 2007, 
expressing his concerns about the presence of a third party observer 
during a neuropsychological exam. 
FURTHER your Affiant saith naught. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to 
otary Public for Idaho ~' 
Residing a.t ~oise, Id.aho (. if 
My CommIssIon ExpIres: I de 1/ 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW O. PAPPAS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO I.C. §§ 72-433 AND 72-434 - 2 
""'-" 
CERTIFICATE ~~ERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of August, 2007, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW O. 
PAPPAS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO I.C. §§ 72-
433 AND 72-434 by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated 
below, addressed as follows: 
R. Brad Masingill 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone: (208) 414-0665 
Facsimile: (208) 414-0490 
Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 938-5584 
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482 
[~U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[] Hand-Delivered 
[J Overnight Mail 
[~ Facsimile 
(/ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[] Hand-Delivered 
[] Overnight Mail 
[....}/' Facsimile 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW O. PAPPAS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO I.C. §§ 72-433 AND 72-434 - 3 
Cr aig W. Beaver, Ph.D., ABPP - eN 
Licensed Psychologist 
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 220 • Boise~ Idaho 83706 • (208) 336-2972 • Fax (208) 336·4408 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 5445 • Boise, Idaho 83705 
July 30; 2007 
Matthew O. Pappas 
Anderson, Julian & Hull. LLP 
250 ~ollth Fl fl.h Street, Ste. 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
RE: IME of Lesia J. Knowlton 
Dear Mr. Pappas: 
This letter is in rosponse to your inquiry about Ms. Knowlton·s attorney attending the scheduled 
neuropsychological !ME of Ms. Knowlton on August 23 and 24 0[2007. First of all, I have no 
objection to her attorney. Mr. Troupis, audiotape recording both the interview and testing. Also, 
Mr. Troupis is certainly welcome to wait in our waiting room while Ms. Knowlton is interviewed 
and undergoes testing so if she has any questions or concerns and wishes to consult with her 
attorney, he could be readily available. The same would also be lru~ if she requested to be able 
to contact him during the evaluation via cell phone. 
However, there is research that shows having the presence of a third party observer, such as an 
attorney. disrupts the evaluation process. In fact, there are both ethical concerns about having a 
thiTd [ler~onJobserver present, particularly during the testing, as well as issues of it affc:xling both 
rapport and test performance. Therefore) again, while audiotape recording is certainly 
reasonable and not particularly intrusive, having a third party present in the examination room is 
disruptive with a number of other concerns . . I have included an article from 1998 that outlines 
some of those concerns. These concerns are still present today. 
If you have questions or need for further clarification regarding these issues. please do not 
hesitate to contact me. 
Sincerely. 
c21 aifd J.J!?LtliJ-0L~. 
Craig w. v.:.V:;PhD, Anpp 
Diplomate in Clinical Neuropsychology 
CWB:je 
ene. 
Diplomate in Clinical Neu.-opsychology, American Board of ProfeSSional Psychology 
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The Clinil;uJ NeuropsYChologist 
1998. Vol. 12. No.4. pp. 552-559 
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© SwetS & ZeitUnger 
THE ETHICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGIST 
Ethical Issues Related to the Presence of Third Party 
Observers in Clinical Neuropsychological Evaluations:t' 
A. John McSweenyJ, Bruce C. Becker. Richard 1. Naugle), William O. Snow4• 
Lnurcl1ce M. BindeF. and Lae[itia L. Thompson6 
IMedical College of Ohio. Toledo. OH. ~Bethesda. MD, 'Cleveland Clinic Foundation. Cleveland. OH. 
·'Toronto. ON. SBeaverton. OR. and 6UniveThity of Colorado Medicnl Center. Denver. CO 
ABSTRACT 
The presence of third parties during neurop~ychological examinations has long been permitlcd fo~ trainin£ 
or assisting examiners. Recently. clinical ~UJ'oPGychologi$t:J have been requested to allow thmi party 
ou~c=rvers who are working in the interest of parties in legal disputes. This paper examines the ethical 
implications of the use of third party ()bservcr~ and makes recommcnd:.ltions a.~ to how clinical 
neurop$ychologists might handle requests for their presence. 
Clinical neuropsycho}ogists are more frequently 
encountering ~itU;ttions in whi~h the presence of 
a third party is requested (or demanded), most 
often in the context of a forensic evaluation. 
This pa.f\E."r is offen;d in [htl interest of informing 
clinical neuropsychologists and others of the 
ethical implications of third party observerS at 
neuropsychological evuluations. The paper grew 
our of discussions at meetings of the Division 40 
Ethics Commirree and may be considered to be 
the product of idea:; presented by Conunittee 
members. However. it is not an official position 
statement of Division 40 or its Ethics Commit-
te!' .. 
Background 
Third po.rty participants in psychological aSSess-
ments have been commonly pennitted for many 
years for purposes of training supervisioll. That 
is. a supervisor may llccompany :l student when 
the student is conducting an evaluation. In this 
situation the pre~ence of the superv isor is seen 
as helpful to both the patient and the student. 
Similarly, the presence of a third party in the 
fottn oftranslarnr m;lY be indicatcd when a non-
English-speaking per~on is being evaluated. 
(The evaluarion of non-English-speaking per-
sons present~ a \fru'iety of ethkal and technical 
challenges that are beyond the scope of this pa-
per. The reader is advised to consult Artiola I 
Fortuny and Mullaney (1998) for an extended 
discussion.) 1n some: but not all. cases. the pres-
ence of a parent may have a calming effect and 
thllS petmit a more vnlid assessment of an anx-
ious child. In a somewhat unusual twist on this 
latter situation. one of the authors (AIM) found 
• Til,; authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of past and present Division 4(\ Ethics Committee mem-
ber!: who, in addition to the authors. partici~lcd in the discussions which ted to the preparution of this article: 
Lydia Artiola I rortuny. Wiley Mittcnberg. Anne M. Schneider. and Mdvirt L. Schwllrtl.. The authors also wish 
to thank M. Frank Greiffcnsteiu for his assistance in providing several affidavits related to the issues in this 
article. 
Address correspondence to : A. John McSween),. Depunment of Psychiatry. Medical CoHee" of Ohio. Richu.xLl 
Ruppert Healtb Comer, 3120 Glendale AVcnllc. Toledo, OR 43614-58U!1. USA. E-mnil; jmcsweeny@mco.edu. 
Accepted ror publication: September 2.1998. 













































ETHICAL ISSUES RELATED TO THIRD PARTY OBSERVERS 553 
Lh<lt u somewhat confused. suspicious, and non-
cooperntive patient who was being evaluated in 
reference to criminal charges against him, per-
formed considerably better and was much more 
cooperative when his defense attorney MiS aL-
lowed to observe the evaluation through a one-
way window, even though the attorney had ex-
plained to the patient in advance that the evalua-
lion was requested on his behalf. 
The practice of allowing [hird pany observers 
appears to be in contradiction to the Standards 
for Educarional and Psychological Tesrs (Amer-
ican Psychological Association, 1985) which 
indicates thllt "In typical applications test ad-
ministrators should follow carefully the stan-
dardized proccdures for administration and scor-
ing by the test publisher ... (Standard 15.1)". 
and "The tes[ing environment should be one of 
reasonable comfort with minimal distractions .... 
(Standard 15.2)" The presence of a third party 
observer may violate the standardized proce-
dures specified by the test publisher, and may 
cause more than minimal disrraction for the sub-
ject. Limited empirical data exist on the e.ffect of 
such an observer on the examinee, and whether 
that effect is differcnt when the observer is a 
lawyer, Mother neuropsychologist. or· another 
professic.)nal such as :a nume, paralegal. or a fam-
ily member. The effect of these various observ-
ers on the examiner's hehaviol' also is unknown 
and is deserving of empirical study. 
In extreme and probably rare situations. an 
observer may overtly :md intentionally intcrlcre 
in an examination. Even when the observer does 
not interfere. his or her mere presence during a 
neuropsychological examination may affect lhe 
results of the assessment. Third parties may rep-
resent a distraction or may provide an incentive 
for improved perfon-n:mce llS cvidcn .. ed by so-
dal facilitation research (McCaffery, Fisher, 
Gold, & Lynch, 1996). A Case study using an A-
R-A-B design by Bin de. and Johnson-Greene 
(1995) demonstrated that the presence of an 
adult patient's mother negatively affected the 
patient'~ performance ou a task commonly used 
to detect malingering. 
Although the use of supervisors and transla-
tOrS may raise SOUlt: technical questions con-
cerning the validity of the ex:amination. their use 
BOtrtr-9E:E:fB021 
has not resulted in as much controversy as is the 
case when the ethical principles and practice 
standards of clinical neuropsychologil:tl: have 
come into conflict with standards and practices 
within the legal profession during forensic eval-
uations. The most common scenario for third 
party observers is that in which a clinical neuro-
psycholosist has agreed to provide an indep~n­
dent evaluation of a plaintiff in !1 person~l injury 
suit at the request of the defense nnorney. In 
these cases. the plaintiff's attorney may request 
that his or her eXfll':rt witness or other observe. 
be present during the evaluation, presumably to 
ensure that the evaluation is properly conducted 
and accllt:llely reported. The observer may be itll 
attorney, a clinical neuropsychologist or psy-
chologist, a legal paraprofessional. nur!\e, or 
other type of helllth professionaL 
Legal Status of Third Party Observers 
McCaffery et Ill. (1996) provided a detailed 
analysis of the legal ramifications of third party 
observers and discussed the implications of the 
presence of third panics on the validity ot" neu-
ropsychological evaluations. Accordingly, legal 
issues will only be discussed briefly in this pa-
per. 
When presented with a request to allow a 
third party observer during an examination by a 
plaintiff's attorney, the defense attorney will 
often object, arguing that such observation was 
not permitted during the plaintiff's original eva!-
uillion, and if there is any advantage to be 
gained by such observation. it should have been 
offered to both parties. In addition. the defense 
attorney may present the objections of the neu-
ropsychological examiner. including the posi-
[ion that the presence of a third party observer 
potentially interleres with the valid administra-
tion of standardized tests and distorts the results 
in ways which are not known because they have 
not been researched. 
It is apparent that judges have a good deal of 
latitude in determining whether or not thlrd 
party observers should be allowed and that the 
legal status of third party observers in clinical 
neuropsychological evaluations continues to 
evolve. A recent Federal Court decision (Ragge 
v. MeA/Universal Studios, 1995) is panicularly 
ant_ 
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relevant . The plaintiff's Ilttorney requc::;led [hat 
a third party observer be present during the psy-
chological examination of the plaintiff con-
dllCT~cI at the request of the defen:;c attorney. In 
addition. the plaintiff s attorney asked that the 
psychologist disclose the tests to be adminis-
t(!l'ed in advance. The psychologist and the de-
fense attorney objected to the conditions speci-
fied by the plaintiffs attorney. The Coutt ruled 
in f;lVor of the do:fem;c noting that "Third party 
observers may, regardless of their good inten-
tions, contaminate a mental examination" and 
that "thc potcnti"l for a third party observer to 
interfere with, or even contaminate, a mental 
examination, is recognized in California Code of 
Civil I'roced\.lre Section 2032(g)(I), which pro-
vides that an observer may be present at a physi-
cal examination but does not provide for an ob-
server al i:I memal examination:' The Court also 
concluded that the psychologist did not intend to 
use "unorthodox or potentia.lly harmful tech-
niqu~~ in his t:xat(unation of plaintiff. requiring 
that a third party be present". and bec:wse 
"nothing unusual or improper W:\S proposed" 
there was no reason to require thalthe psycholo-
gist disclose the tests he planned to use in ad-
vance. Whereas the decisions of this fedel":'Il 
COl1rt are not binding or relevant in other juris-
dictions, they can be cited in legal arguments. ln 
addition, the decisions provide legal support for 
conducting psychological evaluations in a stan-
dard manner in forensic situations. 
Etbical Principles and Standards Applying 
to Third Party Observers in Forensic Situa-
tions 
A clinical neuropsychologist may be asked to 
perform'an evaluation in which a third party ob-
server is to be present or he or she may be asked 
to serve as a third party observer in an examina-
tion conducted by another neuropsychologist In 
the first situation, the neuropsychologisl must 
decide whether it is ethica.l to proceed with the 
evaluation in which a third party observer is 
present. In the lanes llitu:ltion. tho: n~uropsycbol­
ogist must decide whether or not he or she 
should agree to serve as an observer. 
The EthiMI Principles of f'yychologists and 
Code of Conduct of the American Psychological 
Association (1992) do not address the is~ue 
third party observers directly. However. seve) 
of the General Principles and Ethical Standar· 
have relevance lind are listed below. 
General Principles 
There are six General Principles: (A) Compe 
tence, (B) Integrity, (C) Professional and $ciell 
tine Responsibihry. (n) Respect for Pcople' 
Rights and Dignity, (E) Concern for Other' 
Welfare. and (F) Social Responsibility. Tht 
General Principle~ Me intended to be a:;pir· 
alional rather than enforceable. General Princi-
ples A, B, C, E, and F appear to have particular 
relevance to the: issue of third party \.lbservers. 
Principle A states, in part "In those area.s in 
which recognized professional standards do not 
yet exi!lt. psycho\ogi,ts c"crci:;e carefUl Judge-
ment and take appropriato precautions to protect 
the welfare of those with whom they work_ They 
maintl'lin knowledge of Idcvant scientific and 
professional information related to the services 
they render. _." If one recognizes that the prel;-
~nce of third pArties is an emplfical issue that is 
as yet unresolved, and accepts the responsibility 
that a third party's presence could have a l\ega~ 
tivc impact VII testing, the neuropsychologist 
should consider how observing might affect the 
patient. Tho neuropsychologist who consider>: 
Ob3cfving another's examination bas the obliga-
tion to consider the effects of such observation. 
nOt just on the patient's performance. but also 
on the types Of advice he or she is obligated to 
provide to the lawyer who asks for the observa-
tion of the patient's performance. For example, 
a reasonable neuropsychologist might inform a 
lawyer thLlt although be or she does not believe 
that the presence of an observer would affcct 
testing, other psychologists would likely dis-
agree. 
Principle B indicates that psychologists pru-
mOle integrity in the practice of psychology. 
This would imply that psychologistS should 
prOlctice in a fashion that ~voids threi.\lS to the 
validity of their results. If the presence of a third 
pa.rty observer can have a negative effect on the 
validity of the ex:\mination. it may be seen M 
inconsistent with the Principle of Integrity. In 
addition, PrinCiple B notes that psychologists 
f"'T1' • 
,_ .... ___ 8 _ 
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"attempt to cladfy [or relevant parties the roles 
they are perfonning and to function in accor-
dance with those role!;". Thus. if a ncuropsy-
chQIQgist i~ to serve as a lhlrd party observer. 
the neurop~ychologist should take care to pre-
cisely define his or her role with both attomeys. 
the oth.:r neuropsychologist involved, and the 
person to be examined. in advance of the exami-
nation. The neurop!lychologist, for example. 
shvulu l:onsider whether there is any set of cir-
cumstances that might warrant intervening in rhe 
assessment (e.g .. if it was thought that the pa-
lit:lll was abused by the nAture of the interaction 
with the assessing neuropsychologist),and com-
r'nunicme this clearly, il'l advance. to all COn-
l:cmed. 
Principle B also indicates that "Psychologists 
avoid improper nnd potentially hannful dual 
relationShips". Un occasion, a neuropsycholo~ 
gist who has Msessed the patient in the past for 
reasons other than forensic purposes (e.g .• while 
the patient was in the hospital) or who has had a 
treating relationship with the patient may be 
asked to serve in the role of observer. The 
neuropsychologist who has a clinical relation-
ship should give due consideration to the prob-
lems that may arise in the context of engaging in 
the role of' forensic; psychologist. If the clinician 
becomes involved with forensic tasks. the thera-
peutic role may be adversely affected. The pa-
tient may perceive the clinician as someone who 
might provide support or SOlutions for compen-
sating for the effects of an injury and/or over-
coming a disability. The patient may perceive a 
forensic ex:pert as someone who will document 
the c;ltistence of symptoms and disnhi lily, Inevi-
tably. acting as an observer of a forensic exami-
nation will move the Ileurop~ychologist into a 
forensic role. 
Principle C instructs psychologists to "clarify 
their professional roles and obligations" as well 
as to "accept appropriate r~spom.ibility for thcir 
behavior" . Therefore. even if a judge or both 
attomeys agree to an evaluation with a third 
patty observer present. thl!) neuropsychologist 
must make the final decision as to whether he or 
she will act in that capacity. 
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Principle E advises that '·When conflicts oc-
CUT among psychologists' obligations or con-
Cl'!m.s. thev tl.uelllpllo resolve these conflkts and 
perform their roles in a responsible fashion thnt 
avoids or minimizes harm". Although Principle 
E does not provide Advice for specific: actions to 
ta~e. it docs set a general tone for resolving con-
flicts. 
Principle F has several a..<tpeC:IS that apply to 
forensic situations in general and. by extension. 
to the issue of third patty observers. First. it sug-
gests that " Psychologist~ ar~ aware of their pro-
fessional and scientific responsibilities to the 
community and the society in which they work 
and live" including hy ~~tet\!lion. the legal sy$~ 
tern. Second. it advises that "psychologists try 
to avoid misuse of their work" including. pre-
sumably. by attOfT\I'!YS. Thus. if sorving as iI thi,.d 
party observer at the request of an attorney is 
unethical. the neuropsychologist has the respon-
sibility for l'~,(',ogni:zins this fact and for refusing 
the attorney's request. Finally, Principle F states 
"Psychologists comply with the law and en-
cotlrnge the development of law and social pOI~ 
icy that serve the interestS of their patients and 
clients and tho public". Thus, neuropsycholo-
glsts should not merely be ~ontclll with the sta-
tus quo in the legal system but should attempt to 
improve it. In some respects. the current paper is 
offered in the spirit of this prinCiple. 
Ethical Standards 
Thore are eight categol'ic~ of Ethical Standards; 
(1) General Standards. (2) Evaluation. Assess-
ment or Intervention. (3) Advenising and other 
Public Statement, (4) Therapy. (:i) Privacy and 
Confidentiality, (6) Training. Training Supervi-
sion Research and Publishing. (7) Forensic Ac-
tivities, 1ll1d (8) Resolving Ethical Issues. In con~ 
rrast to the General Principles. the Standards are 
considered to be enforceable. Thus. they repre-
sellllllinimum standards of conduct for psychol-
ogists. In this paper. we limit our review to !!tan-
dards in categories 1,2,5 and 7. because these 
have particular relevance to the issue of third 
party observers. although there may be others 
that are relevant. 
1.02 Reltlrionship of Erhics and the Law: "If 
psychologists' ethical responsibilities conflict 
556 A. JOHN MCSWBENY eT AL. 
with the law. psychologists make known their 
commitment to the Erhic;s Code and take steps to 
resolve the conflict in a tl".sponS:ible manner". 
Comment. This principle echos in a somewhat 
more specific way the sentiments expressed in 
Principle E. Essentially. it indicntes that when a 
psychologist finds that what slhe is requested to 
do by the legal sy~tem is in conflict with the 
Ethics Code. s/he i~ oblig!lted to act in a proac-
tive manner to resolve the conflict. As Canler et 
al. (1994) point out. doing nothing when one is 
aware of a legallt':thical conflict may be an ethi-
cal violation. Accordingly, if one believes that 
serving as a third pan)' observer or allowing a 
third PartY oh:c:,t':Tver to be pre3cnt during it neu-
ropsychological evaluation represents an ethical 
conflict, the psychologist should take action to 
infonn the rl'\levant partic3 of this I;UUtlict anel 
hislhcr commiunem to the Ethics Code. Thi~ 
may be done orally or in writing. as the situation 
require~ . 
1.03 Professional and Scientific Relationship: 
"Psychologists provide diagnostic, therapeutic. 
reaching. re!:earch, supervisvry, consultative, or 
other psychological services only in the context 
of a defined professional or scientific relation-
ship l'Ir role". (Sec comments following Stan-
dard 2.01(a) below.) 
1.15 Misuse of PsychologisTS' Influence 
"PsycholoZist3 nre alert to and guard against ... 
factors that might lead to misuse of their influ-
ence". 
Comment. A neuropsychologist who acts as 
an observer may, in his or her own mind, be 
playing a useful role in the forensic context, but 
should also k~p in mind that the lawyer may be 
more interested in the neuropsychologist as a 
"weapon" than as a professional. 
1.16(a) Misuse a/Psychologists' Work "Psy-
chologists do not participate in activities in 
which it appears likely that their skills or data 
will be misused by others. unless corrective 
mechanisms are available". 
Comment. If a neuropsychologist choose~ to 
:se,ve as a third party observer, he or she beaTS 
the responsibility for preventing the misuse of 
his or her expertise. For example. this reJlpon$i. 
bilily may not be transferred to the requesting 
attorney. 
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1.17( b) Multiple Relationships "Whenever 
feasible, a psychologist refmins from taking on 
profc:;:;ionlll or scientitic obligations when pre-
existing relationships would create a risk of such 
harm". 
Comment. Should a neuropsychologist, who 
hall done an assessment for the parientJ's-lawyer 
or has provided the lawyer with a report, engage 
in being an observer as well? It might be argued 
that the neuropsychologist who engages in pro-
viding an opinion for tbe patient's lawyer runs 
the nslc of becoming an advocate rather than an 
expert. 
2.01 (a) Evaluations. Diagnosis. alld [n/erven-
tions in Professional Collte,n: "Psychologists 
perfonn evaluations, diagnosis, and interven-
tions only within tbe context of a definr:o profes-
sional relationship". 
Comment Standard 2.0 I (a) iterates 1.03 with 
a specific reference to the clinic~l situation. 
Some psychologists might argue that serving as 
a third party observer is not consistent with a 
"defined professional or Jlcientifie l'elntion$hip 
or role". However, we do not believe that 1.03 
and 2.01(a) were designed to Testrict psycholo-
gists to traditional prllctic£!s. On rhc other hand. 
it is important to define the parnmeters of one's 
role as a third party observer nnd inform nil the 
other parties involved, especinHy given the non-
traditional nature of this practice. 
2.0J( b): "Psychologists' assessments,recom-
mendations. rr:ports. and p$ycholoc;ical diagnos-
tic or evaluative statements aTe based on infor-
mation and techniques (including pel'SQoal inter-
views <If the individual wheu appropriate) suffi-
cient to provide appropriate substantiation for 
their findings" . 
Comment. Standard 2.0 1 (b) simply indicates 
that psychologists should use assessment tech-
niques that will allow them to substantiate the 
conclusions that they reach. To the extent that 
the presence of a third party observer alters the 
testing situation, the ability to substantiate the 
examiner's cOllduslons ~uners. 
2.02( a) Comp~tence and Appropriau Use of 
Assessmenrs (lnd Interventions: "Psychologists 
who develop, administer, score, interpret, or use 
psychologiCAl assessment techniques, inter-
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and for purpuses that. arfl appropriate in light of 
the research on or evidence of the usefulness 
and proper application of the techniques" . 
CommenT. Standard 2.02(a) is pnrtioul:u-Iy 
relevant to the topic of this paper because many 
psychologists (e.g .• McCaffery et nt. 1996) at-
gue that the pre~t~nce of :\ third pOrty nlters the 
test situation to the extent that the validity of the 
test results is significantly affected. There are 
limited data on thill issue with regard to neulo-
psychological tests: the results of social facilita-
tion research and one study with neuropsycho-
logical data do ~ugsest tha.t third partic~ I;an 
have a significant effect on test perfonnance as 
noted previously. Whereas more research is 
needed to darify the effectt' of third l'arties 011 
neuropsychological test results. preliminary data 
suggest that using third parties In the testing sit-
uation i!: potentially in confiil;t with tbis princi-
ple. 
2.02(b): "Psychologists refrain from the mis-
use of SI~seS!lroent techniques, iuterventions, re-
~ults, and interpretations and take reasonable 
steps to prevent others from misusing the infor-
mation these tochnique:s provide. This includes 
refraining from l'elt~asing raw test results or raw 
data to persons, other than to patients or clients 
a~ llpptOpriato, who are 110t qualified to use SUch 
information" . 
Commml. To some extent principle 2.02(b) 
reiterates the more gem:ral point made by princi-
ple 1.16. However, it also specifically refers to 
the problem of releasing raw data to unqualified 
per~on~. One could argue that allowing a third 
party to be present during an evaluation consti-
tutes releasing raw data to that third party. 
Thel'eruTe, If the individual is not a neuropsy-
Chologist, the presence of the third party during 
a neuropsychological examination represents a 
potential ethical conflict. 
2.04(c): Use of Assessment in General and 
with Special Populations. "PsychologistS at-
tempt to identify situations in which panicular 
interpretations or assessment techniques or 
nonns may nOt be applicable .. ." 
Comment. Although the focus of 2.04 (c) is 
on issues of raCial, sexual, ethnic, and similar 
discrimination we should be aware that no 
nonns exi:;l for testing in the presence of third 
party observers. 
2.05: ITHerpreting Assessment Results: 
"Wltc::n interpreting assessment results. includ-
ing automated interpretations, psychologists 
take into account the various test factors and 
c,;huructertstics of the person being assessed that 
might affect psychologists' judgements or re-
duce the accuracy of their interpretations. They 
indicate any significant reservations they have 
about the accuracy or limitations of their inter-
pretations" . 
Comment. This standard applies directly to 
the concerns about the effects of the presence of 
a tbird party on the validity - and. consequently. 
the intetprctability - of test results . Thus, if c1in~ 
ical neuropsychologists decide to permit a third 
party to be present during the examination. they 
should include appropriate caveats about the 
validity of the test results in their reports. 
McCaffery et al. (1996) su~gest that dillcrepan-
des between assessment results obtained over 
different sessions, with or without third party 
obsotvers, be discussed and that the behavior of 
the third party ar\d possible impact on the test 
results be described. 
2.10 Maintaining Tut Security: "Psy<;holu-
giStS make reasonable efforts to maintain the 
integrity and security of tests and mher aSSess-
ment techniques cnnsbtent with the law, con-
tractual obligations, and in a manner thal per-
mits compliance with the requirements of this 
Ethics Code" . 
Comment. Third party observers present po-
tential risk to test security unless they agree not 
to divulge any of the lest questions to others, in 
advance of the evaluation. 
5.02 Maintaining Confidentiality: "Psychol-
ogi~ts have a primary Obligation and take rea-
sonable precautions to respect the confidential· 
tty rights of those with whom they work or con-
sult .. ." 
Comment. Several confidentiality issues are 
mised by the maner of third party observers. 
This applic$ to buth the patient and the neuro-
psychologist being observed. In particular, the 
neuropsychologist who Setves as an observer 
should consider the limits of what he or she may 
Sod 
558 A. JOHN MCSWEI;NY '£T AL. 
teve:tl nbout the neufor:;Yl.:hologist in the con-
text of conversations with colleagues and in 
other legal cases. 
7.01 Pmjessilmulism; "PsyChologists who 
perform forensic functions, such as assessments. 
interviews, consultations, reports or expert testi-
mony, must comply with aU other provisions of 
this Ethics Code to the extent that they apply 
such activities ...... 
COIT11T11:nl. Standard 7.01 malces clear that the 
other provi!lions of the Ethics Code apply to fo-
rensic simations in general and, by extension. to . 
situations involving ttlird party observers. Thus. 
should neuropsychologists agree to serve as 
third party observers or to permit third parties to 
be I-m:sem dUring fOrensic evaluations. the Eth-
ics Code applies even if the situation is noo-tra-
diti<mal in nature. 
7.02 Forensic Assessments: (a) "Psycholo-
gist'!' assessments, recommendations. and re-
ports are based on infonnation and techniques 
(InclUding personal interviews of the individual. 
when appropriate) sufficient to provide appro-
priate substantiation for their findings. . 
(b) bxcept as noted in (c), below. psycholo-
gists provide written or oml forensic reports or 
testimony of the psychological characteristic:-; of 
an individual only after they have conducted an 
examination of the individual adequate to sup-
port their statements or conclusions. 
(c) When, despite reasonable efforts. such an 
examination is not feasible, psychologists clar-
ify the impact of their limited information on the 
reliability and validity of their reports and testi-
mony, and they appropriately limit the nature 
and ex.tent of their eOnc\II"10nll and recommen-
dations". 
Comment. Standard 1.02 indicates that. in 
general. a neuropsychologist should only c:<,-
press an opinion about a person when he or she 
has conducted a standard evaluation. If this is 
not possible. 8!': il'\ the case when a thi .. d party Is 
present. then the neuropsychologist should com-
municate the appropriate caveats, as noted 
above, abollf the validity of the te~l dam. 
7.04 TTUlhfoln.ess and Candor. "(a) In foren-
sic testimony and reportS, psychologists testify 
truthfully. honestly, and eandhlly and, conSIstent 
80vv-9P-p-fAn~l 
with applicable legal procedures. describe fairl3 
the bases for their testimony and conclusions." 
(b) "Whenever necessary [0 avoid ml!<lead. 
ing. psychologists ackMw\edge the limits 0 1 
their data or conclusions." 
Comment. Standard 7.04 again I.'!mphasize" 
the need to communicate any limitations in the 
validity of an examination that may result from 
the presence of a third party. 
7.06 Compliance with Law alld Rules. "IIl 
pertonning forensic roles. psychologists arc rea· 
sonably familiar with the rilles governing their 
roles. Psychologists are aware of the occasion-
ally competing demands placed upon them by 
these principle!l lind the requirements of the 
court system, and attempt to resolve these con-
flicts by making known their commitment to this 
Ethics Cod/': and taking steps to resulve the con-
flict in a responsible manner" . 
Commellt. Standard 7.06 indicates that it i~ 
the re~ponsibility of the neuropSYChologist to 
recognize that the request to serve as, or permit 
the presence of. a third party observer represents 
1\ potential ethical conflict. The neuropsychOlo-
gist is also obligated to let others. such as law-
yers and/or judicial personnel. know of the con· 
flict with the APA ethiCS code. Finally. the neu-
ropsychologist is required (0 resolve the conflict 
responsibly. As noted by Canter et aJ. (1994). 
StOlndllrQ 7.06 does not require psychologists to 
take "heroic" measures that might result in in-
carceration - for example. for di$obeyin~ n 
judge's urder. 
DISCUSSION 
Requests or demands to allow the pre~E>ncc of II 
third party observer present a challenge to 
neuropsychologists. Although the Ethics Code 
does not explicitly prohibit the presence of third 
parties, We suggest that neuropsychologists 
serving as expertS in litigation make an effort to 
ex.clude observers ftom the portion of the foren-
sic evaluation involving standardized testing. 
One mny justify this position by citing the likeli -
hood thac the presenc~ of an intere!ltcd ob:;c:rver 
is potentially a substantially confounding factor 
..J~T.T""" .- .. -
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and. as such. violSl\es: the lltrmdardized testing 
environment. For the same reason, we would 
generally recommend against serving as a third 
party ob!'!crvet in a forensic eV:1luation_ 
A number of compromises may be offered if 
the neurop1>ychologis( is faced with a request or 
demand for :1 third party observer_ Thc prcncnce 
of a third pany during the initial interview, in 
which questions are asked about symptoms and 
comfl'll\nts, memories about thc incident that 
precipitated cognitive complaints. psychosocial 
hi!'tory and related issues, is not inappropriate 
~nd would not nocessarily compromise lIJC lcSt~ 
iog procedure (unless the observer objects to 
certain questions and/or forbids the patient to 
rMpond. thus "priming" th~ patieut IU be non-
cooperative). The observcr's departure at the 
outset of the sta.ndardized testing ponion of the 
evaluation would pl'C$crve its validiry and confi-
dentiality wilhotlt denying the plaintiff's attor-
ney critical information because standardized 
a.dministr~tion jncludc~ vcrbatim responses to 
most tests that can then be reviewed by the 
plaintiff's expert. 
Another :lUggesteu alternative is to record {he 
testing session with audio Or audiovisunl de-
vices, for review by the plaintiff's expen. A 
third alternative i::; to anow the plaintiff's expert 
(or other qunlified observer) to view the pro-
ceedings through a one-way window. However, 
we should c4lution that tbe presumed relative 
lack of observer effects with either of these al-
ternatives awaits empirical confirmation and test 
Beeuriry may be at risk. In addition. some de-
fense attorneyl': may not agree to [hese terms. 
Accordingly. we cannot endorse the use of re-
curding devices or viewing through one-way 
windows without qualification_ 
Although the deCision of Rag}?e v_ MeAl 
Universal Srudio.~ would seem to set a precedent 
~gainst the use of third party observers. judges 
10 most venues may order whatever a!'Nlnge~ 
mems they choose in accordance with the law in 
their Jurisdiction. We suggest that neuropsychol-
ogists provide the coun with 8n affidavit ex-
plaining these issues. In many cases, such argu-
~ents prevail and. as in the case of Ragge. 
Judge~ have ruled that no oh!:erver be present. 
Ot""'lJ..L n,......"'i>--- .. 
Whcnjudgcs rule thctt an observer be pre::ent. or 
issue a coun order for a.n observer. the neuro-
psychologist should request that the observer be 
a qUll.lifil:llll~uropsychologist. as defined by Di-
vision 40 criteria (1989). In addition. instruc-
tions to the observer should include stipulations 
lo n:main as unobtrusive as posslble so as to 
provide minimal for distraction or inftuence_ 
Finally. consistent with the suggestions of 
McCaffery et a!. (1996). the neuropsychological 
repon resulting from the evaluation should in-
clude a section concerning the behavior of the 
observer and any possible effects the observer's 
presence and behavior may have had on the Va-
lidity of the results_ 
In the final analysis. unloss the neuropsychol-
ogist is an employee of the coun, he or she can 
always refuse to proceed with an evaluation if 
reasonable conditions that preserve the validity 
of the evaluation are not agreed upon. In SOme 
cases. this may be the best recourse_ 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LESIA KNOWLTON, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) IC 2000-030269 
v. ) 
) 
WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 




F I L E FREMONT COMPENSATION ) 





IDAHO INSURANCE ) 
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Party ofInterest, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Defendants filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pursuant to I.e. §§72-433 and 72-434, 
with supporting affidavit and memorandum, in the above-entitled matter on July 13, 2007. 
On July 30, 2007, Defendants filed supplemental memorandum and affidavit. Defendants seek 
an order from the Commission staying all proceedings in this matter until such time that 
Claimant fully submits and cooperates during the examination to be conducted by Dr. Beaver. 
The Referee having reviewed the file herein and being fully advised in the premises, 
HEREBY ORDERS that Defendants' Motion to Suspend Proceedings is GRANTED. 
Claimant may be accompanied by a medical doctor or a Ph.D. psychologist of her own 
selection and at her own expense. Claimant may audio tape - but not video tape - the 
examination at her own expense. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS - 1 
")( -, 
Attorneys are not permitted to be present at the examination. 
These conditions are consonant with longstanding practice of the Industrial Commission 
as with Idaho case law regarding worker's compensation cases. 
This stay shall remain until Claimant cooperates with an examination to be conducted by 
Dr. Beaver to be set at a time and place in the near future and agreeable to all parties. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this d..~ day of August, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of August, 2007, a true an~ correct,?op,Xof 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS was 9~b:t.'YJJ';:'~1i1tiiJlf1fl{ift "' '.' ". '" " JJ:';, ... , .... 'c', 2<,~'j,.· 
Mlichili:e;I/I!h~:ess. ONLY upon each of the following: ' 
R. Brad Masingill 
Christ T. Troupis 
Alan K. Hull 
db 
Fax #: 208-414-0490 
Fax #: 208- 93+482 
Fax #: 3~4-551 0 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS - 2 
R. Brad Masingill 
Attorney at Law 
27 West Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone # 208 414-0665 
Facsimile # 208414-0490 
Email bmasingill@Jiotmail.com 
Christ T. Troupis 
Troupis Law Office 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
P. O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Telephone # 208 938-5584 
Facsimile # 208 938-5482 
Email ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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REQUEST FOR CALENDARING 
I 
Request for Cale*daring - 1 
/ 
TO: The above-named Defendants, WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, Employer and FREMONT 
COMPENSATION INSURANCE GROUP, Surety, Defendants, and their/its attorney of record, 
Alan K. Hull of the Firm ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP: 
COMES NOW, LESIA KNOWLTON, Claimant in the above-entitled case, by and through 
her attorneys of record R. Brad Masingill, of Weiser, Idaho, and Christ T. Troupis of Eagle, Idaho, and 
hereby files the following Claimant's Request for calendaring, pursuant to the Industrial Commission 
Rules of Procedure, Rule XII. 
Claimant hereby requests that the case be set for hearing. Claimant is not completely medically 
stable, but accurate data can now be presented for evaluation. 
Further, Claimant has answered discovery, per the request of Defendants, and is therefore 
completely prepared and ready for hearing. 
The issues to be heard and decided by the COmmISSIOn include the extent of claimant's 
permanent impairment, the extent of claimant's disability, and total temporary disability, as well as 
retraining benefits and attorney fees. 
Claimant herein requests that the matter be set for hearing at the Industrial Commission offices 
in Boise, Idaho. 
COUNSEL'S NON-AVAILABLE DATES ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
SEE ATTACHED CALENDAR 
DATED this 30th day of November, 2007. 
Christ T. Troupis 
Attorney for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the 30th day of November, 2007, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing REQUEST FOR CALENDARING mailed by regular United State mail, postage prepaid 
thereon to the following: 
AlanK. Hull 
ANDERSON, WLIAN & HULL, LLP 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
P. O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
~j)P 
Christ T. Troup~ 
Attorney for Claimant 
Request for Calendaring - 3 
Anderson, Julian & Hull 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
Alan K. Hull B ISB No.: 1568 
Matthew O. Pappas, ISB No. 6190 
Attorneys for Defendants 
l:1 OBIGI 




























IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY 
ASSOCIATION, Party of Interest, 
Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 1 
I.C. No. 00-030269 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
CALENDARING 
COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their undersigned counsel of record, 
and request the Commission calendar this matter for hearing as follows: 
1. Statement of readiness: Defendants believe this matter will be ready for 
hearing after June 16,2008. 
2. Issues to be heard: When the matter is ready for hearing, the following 
issues should be heard: 
a. The extent that Claimant's condition preexisted her injury and 
apportionment thereto; 
b. Whether Claimant's present complaints are a proximate result 
of her alleged exposure; 
c. The extent of Claimant's PPI and/or PPD; 
d. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional TTD's and/or 
medical benefits; 
e. Whether Claimant is entitled to retraining benefits; and 
f. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees. 
3. Location of hearing: Hailey/Ketchum/Sun Valley, Idaho. 
4. Unavailable dates: Counsel for Defendants has no time available for hearing 
prior to June 16, 2008. Thereafter, counsel is unavailable: 
June 30, 2008; 
July 1-7,2008; 
August 1-8, 2008; 
September 1-8, 2008; 
Counsel is available at any other time. 
5. Length of hearing: One day, plus post-hearing depositions. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 2 
6. Settlement negotiations: It is unknown whether this matter will settle prior 
to hearing. 
7. Assignment to the Commissioners: There is no need to assign this matter 
to the full Commission. 
8. Whether a translator or assisted device is necessary: No translator or 
assisted device is necessary. 
9: Other: Because attorneys' calendars are constantly changing, the available 
dates which are given in this Request may not be available at the time the matter is 
calendared for hearing. Counsel for Defendants would request that the Commission 
conduct a status conference prior to setting a hearing date for the purpose of setting 
hearing and to ensure that the issues listed in the Notice of Hearing are correct. Counsel 
for Defendants believes a conference will avoid setting the hearing on unavailable dates 
and avoid mistakes in r7Pards to the issues to be heard 
DATED this if ~ay of December, 2007. 
ANDERSON, JU IAN & HULL LLP 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r1 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / /'----day of December, 2007, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSfTO REQUEST FOR CALENDARING by delivering 
the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
R. Brad Masingill 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 4 
[~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[] Hand-Delivered 
[] Overnight Mail 
[] Facsimile 
[~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[] Hand-Delivered 
[] Overnight Mail 
[] Facsimile 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LESIA KNOWLTON, ) 
Claimant, ) IC 2000-030269 
v. ) 
) 





FREMONT COMPENSATION ) 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ) F 1 LED 
) 
2 f Surety, ) 
and ) 
) 
IDAHO INSURANCE ) 
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Party of Interest, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on 
JUNE 20, 2008,.t):TtO:OOA:N,t.;]!OliOms;j)A¥, at the Old County Courthouse (208-788-5500), 
3rd Floor Meeting Room, 206 First Avenue South, in Hailey, ID 83333, County of Blaine, 
State ofIdaho, on the following issues: 
1. Whether the condition for which Claimant seeks benefits was caused 
by the alleged industrial accident. 
2. Whether apportionment for a pre-existing condition pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 72-406 is appropriate. 
3. Whether Claimant is medically stable, and if so, the date thereof. 
4. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits: 
a) Temporary partial and/or temporary total disability benefits 
(TPD/TTD); 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
J. 
b) Pennanent partial impairment (pPI); 
c) Disability in excess of impairment; 
d) Retraining; 
e) Medical care; and 
f) Attorney fees. 
t"-
DATED this J7 -- day of December, 2007. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
, . 
" r~ r "'\ ~ '. \.. .•. r----~e'Referee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
rPt. 
I hereby certify that on the J..7 -- day ofDecember?2007,~trueand correctcopy?f 
the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING was served by ~T1IlJ)··:~TA'f~S~ElJ:'itIFi1IlJ> 
MAIL upon each of the following: 
R. Brad Masingill 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, ID 83672-0467 
Christ T. Troupis 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
And by regular United States Mail to: 
M. Dean Willis, CCR (855-9151) 
P.O. Box 1241 
Eagle, ID 83616 
db 
cc: Jenny Lovell (208-788-5500 x 1111) 
Assistant to Blaine Commissioners 
206 First Avenue South, Suite 300 
Hailey, ID 83333 
e-mail address:jlovell@co.blaine.id.us 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
AlanK. Hull 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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F J L EO 
MAR 1 3 2009 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Referee reviewed the file and sets the following briefing schedule: 
Claimant's opening brief shall be filed with the Commission on or before MAY 1, 
2009. Defendants' responsive brief shall be filed on or before MAY 15, 2009. 
Claimant shall have until MAX 29, 2009, if he wishes, to file a reply brief. 
Please advise this office in writing if a reply brief will NOT be submitted. 
Pursuant to a directive from the Commissioners, four copies of all briefs shall be filed 
along with the original to facilitate review of cases. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 13~ day of March, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
rY--
I hereby certify that on the 13 day of March, 2009, a true and correct copy of the 
ORDER ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE was served by regular United States 
Mail upon each of the following: 
R. Brad Masingill 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, ID 83672-0467 
Christ T. Troupis 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Matthew O. Pappas 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
db 
ORDER ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 2 
"fJ' "V:;:J V'-!, lOP Christ I roupis 
;)4/10/09 16: 14 FAX 208:1445510 
Anderson, Julian & Hull 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Offioe Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Te\ephone: (20B) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
Alan K. Hull, IS8 No.: 1568 
Matthew O. Pappas, I SB N D. 6190 















IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY 
ASSOCIA TJON, Party of Interest, 
Defendants. 
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I.C. No. 00-030269 
STIPULA TION EST ABUSHING 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
"J v'=! v:::n::lp Christ Troupis 
04/10/09 16: 14 FAX 2083445510 ANDERSON. JULIAN. & HULL 
p.2 
t@004/004 
COMES NOW the above listed parties and hereby submit this Stipulation to 
schedule post-hearing briefing as foJ[ows: 
Claiman1's opening brief shall be flied with the Commission on 
or before JUNE 12, 2009. Defendants' responsive brief shall be filed 
on or before JUNE 26, 2009. Claimant shall have until JULY 10, 
2009, if she wishes, to file a reply brief and will advise the 
Commission ill writing if a reply brief will NOT be submitted. 
Pursuant to a directive from the Commissioners, four{4} copies of all briefts shall 
be filed along with the original to facilitate review of cases. 
DATED this (od"1-day of ~t~B8rl 2009. 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
BYO-~ 
Christ Troup/s, Of the Flrm 
Attorneys for Claimant 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, lLP 
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" --
Anderson, Julian & Hull 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
ORIGtN!\L 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite-:):PQ 
Post Office Box 7426 ,j",!j ~ '- i r; p t;,: 2 I 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 :-C~ V:-D 
Telephone: (208) 344-580€P: ; ., :1iSSIGN 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
Alan K. Hull, ISB No.: 1568 
Matthew O. Pappas, ISB No. 6190 
A ttorneys for Defendants 











IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY 
ASSOCIA TION, Party of Interest, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 00-030269 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
STRIKE CLAIMANT'S POST-
HEARING REPLY BRIEF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE CLAIMANT'S POST-HEARING REPLY BRIEF - 1 
COME NOW, the Defendants, Wood River Medical Center, and the Idaho 
Insurance Guaranty Association, successor in interest to Ferment Compensation 
Insurance Group, by and through the undersigned Counsel of record, and hereby files 
this Motion to Strike Claimant's July 10, 2009, Post-Hearing Reply Brief. Specifically, 
Defendants object to Claimant's submitting a Reply Brief in excess of approximately 
one and one-half (1 %) pages, as that exceeds the allotted amount provided under 
J .R.P. Rule 11 (A). As explained by the Industrial Commission, "Subsection A limits 
briefing to 30 pages unless prior approval is obtained for additional briefing." J.R.P. 
11 (A) CMT,. 
Claimant's counsel's initial brief, which was forwarded to the Commission on 
June 9, 2009, was forty-five (45) pages long. After defense counsel phoned 
Claimant's counsel and informed them of the thirty page limit for all briefing, including 
both the initial brief and the reply brief. Claimants' counsel submitted a new brief on 
June 11, 2009, that was twenty-eight and one-half (28 %) pages long. Defendants 
filed their brief with the Commission on June 26, 2009, which was twenty-nine (29) 
pages long. Defense counsel was shocked to see Claimant then filed a thirty (30) 
page reply brief on July 10, 2009. 
As mentioned above, Defendants base this motion upon the Industrial 
Commission Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Rule 11 (A). The Rule specifically 
states that unless prior approval is sought from the Commission, briefing should not be 
in excess of thirty (30) pages. See id. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the 
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Industrial Commission must follow their rules and deadlines. Medrano v. Niebauer, 
136 Idaho 767, 40 P.3d 125 (2002). Medrano involved the filing of a motion for 
costs and attorney's fees past the deadline stated by the Commission. The 
Commission ordered the award of attorney's fees despite the late filing. The Supreme 
Court held that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion by disregarding the 
deadlines set by its own rule or order. 
The Industrial Commission and its hearing officers are constrained by clear 
statutory wording even it the result is harsh and arbitrary. Petrie v. Spalding Drywall, 
117 Idaho 382, 788 P.2d 197 (1990). The Supreme Court of Idaho also dictated that 
administrative regulations are subject to the same principles of statutory construction. 
Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 21 P.3d 903 (2001). Where the language is 
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the application of the rules of statutory 
construction. Kootenai Electric Co-op, Inc. v. Washington Water Power Co., 127 
Idaho 432, 901 P.2d 1333 (1995). Claimant's July 10, 2009, Reply Brief does not 
comply with and, in fact, directly contradicts controlling Commission procedural 
dictates. 
The Comment to Rule 11 (A) clarifies any questions that may exist regarding the 
page limits for post-hearing briefing when it unambiguously states "Section (A) limits 
briefing to 30 pages." The inclusion of the "in" to briefing solidifies that each party 
has 30 pages total to present their argument. If this was not the case, then the 
defendant in a matter would always be faced with a punitive 30 page limit and 
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claimant would get the windfall of a 60 pages. No prior stipulation or approval was 
sought regarding an over-limit reply brief and it was made expressly clear to Claimant's 
counsel when they filed their amended initial brief that the 30 page limit applied to all 
briefing. 
Claimant's "Reply Brief" is inappropriate, as well as specifically precluded and 
must be stricken as a matter of law and procedure. Claimant should have taken into 
account how many pages she would devote to her reply when her initial brief was 
crafted. Based upon the foregoing arguments and authority, Defendants respectfully 
request that the Industrial Commission strike Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief and 
proceed to render an opinion based upon the amended initial brief filed by Claimant and 
Defendant's Post-Hearing Response. 
If necessary, Defendants request oral argument on the matter. 
DA TED this / () day of July, 2009. 
ANDERSON JULIA 
By: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10 day of July, 2009, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE CLAIMANT'S POST-
HEARING REPLY BRIEF by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
R. Brad Masingill 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Suite 130 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
[ /U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ J Hand-Delivered 
[ ] ~vernight Mail 
[v-l Facsimile 
[ ~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ J/Overnight Mail 
[-1 Facsimile 
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K. I::)rad Masingill 
R. BRAD MASlNGILL, ISB No. 2083 
Attorney at Law 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. &x467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone (208) 414-0665 
Fax (208)414-0490 
Email bmasingill@hotmail.com 
Christ T. Troupis~ ISB No. 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130 
P. 0# Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Telephone (208) 938-5584 
Fax (208) 938-5482 
Attorneys for Claimant 
208 414-D490 
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COME NOW, the above-named Claimant, Lesia Knowlton, by and through her 
attorney's of record" R Brad MasingiU and Christ T. Troupis, and hereby respond and object to 
the motion to strike filed by the Defendants on Friday, July 10, 2009. 
First" 1he rule upon which the Defendant's motion is made states in pertinent part: 




R. BRAD MASIN GILL, ISB No. 2083 
Attorney at Law 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone (208) 414-0665 
Fax (208) 414-0490 
Email bmasingill@hotmail.com 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB No. 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130 
P. O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Telephone (208) 938-5584 
Fax (208) 938-5482 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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COME NOW, the above-named Claimant, Lesia Knowlton, by and through her 
attorney's of record, R. Brad Masingill and Christ T. Troupis, and hereby respond and object to 
the motion to strike filed by the Defendants on Friday, July 10,2009. 
First, the rule upon which the Defendant's motion is made states in pertinent part: 
Claimant's Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief 1 
"No brief in excess of 30 pages, exclusive of any addendum or exhibit, shall be filed 
without the Commission's prior approval." 
The rule is clear and unambiguous in that it does not state, or imply, that the total pages 
of the Claimant's briefing is limited to 30 pages. In fact, it would have been easy to have simply 
so stated that the combined number of pages for claimant's briefs, initial and reply, are limited to 
30 pages. Since the rule does not so specify, it is clear each brief of the claimant is subject to the 
30 page rule. 
Additionally, several other problems exist if the Defendant's interpretation of the rule is 
adopted: 
1. The reason for plaintiff's (or a claimant in the present case) being able to have the 
first and last comment on the evidence in a case, is the plaintiff has the burden of proof 
Defendant's interpretation removes that right; and 
2. The interpretation by the Defendant also creates a situation where the claimant 
could limit its initial brief to one line and reserve the remaining 29 pages for the closing. The 
Defendant, then, would have nothing to rebut. In turn, the claimant's right to rebut the 
Defendant's brief would be rendered meaningless, or the claimant would simply file its entire 
argument in its reply brief and thus thwart the Defendant's right to reply to claimant's 
arguntents; and 
3. The Defendant's argument further fails to follow the rules of statutory 
construction. Any rule, ordinance, statute, or the like is to be interpreted in such a way as to not 
strain the meaning of the words, nor to change the entire intention of the rule. Defendant's 
interpretation of the rule requires the Commission to add words to the rule which do not appear 
in it. Such a construction is not only strained, but re-writes the entire rule and changes its clear 
Claimant'S Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief 2 
mearnng. The clear intention is to limit each brief to 30 pages, not to create a situation where the 
claimant or the Defendant has to guess at what the other is going to put into the very last brief 
being filed. 
4. Furthermore, the use of the "Comment" as a means of construction of the rule 
presupposes the rule is ambiguous. In fact, the rule is not ambiguous, but only becomes 
ambiguous when the Defendant attempts to use the "Comment" to supplement it. The Comment 
is not intended to be a method of contradicting the clear wording of the rule, but to advise the 
claimant and Defendant to avoid duplication and redundancy in their arguments. 
5. Also, the words in the Comment i.e. "Subsection A limits briefmg to 30 pages" is 
not consistent with the Defendant's tortuous construction. The word briefing is both "singular" 
and "plural" as it is used in the Comment. In other words, the word "briefing" can mean the 
claimant's briefing (either the initial brief or the reply brief, or both). It can mean the 
Defendant's briefing (Defendant's only brief). To torture the words to support a conclusion that 
it must mean the claimant is limited to only a total of 30 pages for both its briefs, renders the 
word "reply" (as used in the rule to describe the right of each party to respond to the others brief) 
meaningless. The Defendant's construction would allow the claimant to put nothing in its initial 
brief, thus giving the Defendant nothing to "reply" to. It is abundantly clear the rule intended to 
have the claimant fully set forth its case, the Defendant to attempt to rebut the same, and for the 
claimant to reply to the Defendant's attempted rebuttal. Defendant's construction would 
emasculate the intention of the words "reply" when referring to the parties' briefing. Statutory 
construction does not allow removing words of a rule to fit a construction any more than it 
permits a party to add words to make it fit a construction; and 
Claimant's Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief 3 
6. Finally, the words of the rule itself belay the Defendants interpretation. The word 
"brief', not "brief~", is used in explaining the allowed pages. The rule states in pertinent part: 
"No brie(in excess of 30 pages ....... ". Under the Defendant's construction, the rule would not 
limit each "brief' to 30 pages, it would limit all brieh. to 30 pages. The Defendant's 
interpretation could also be construed that all briefmg, Defendants and claimants, is limited to 30 
pages. As such, the claimant's 30 page brief would not allow any brief by the Defendant 
because all the "briefing" had been completed. The possible results from the Defendant's 
interpretation of the rule are indeed as preposterous as the "surprise" of Defendant's counsel. 
Claimant agrees with Defendant's claim that agency rules are subject to statutory 
construction. Mason v Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581 (2001). In fact, the Court uses statutory 
construction when interpreting the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. 
Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 396, 405 P.2d 634,637-38 (1965) (interpreting LR.C.P. 65(a) 
and 52(a)). 
In matters of construction, preference is for an interpretation of rules which gives 
meaning to every word, clause, and sentence. Robison v. Bateman-Hall Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 
210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). The flip side of this rule of construction is it is improper to insert 
words or phrases into a sentence to alter its meaning, as Defendant's construction requires. 
It is axiomatic that the central rule of statutory construction is "where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
Claimant's Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief 4 
Ir.-
engaging in statutory construction." State v. Pina, Docket No. 34192 (Idaho 7/8/2009) (Idaho, 
2009). 
Statutes are not to be construed as to negate them entirely. See State v 
Burtlow, 144 Idaho 455, 163 P.3d 244 (2007) which states: 
"It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a 
nullity .... Constructions of a statute that lead to an absurd result are disfavored." 
(Citations Omitted). 
Moreover, "ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present differing 
interpretations to the court." Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs of 
Valley County, 132 Idaho 551 (1999); Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349 (2005) (both 
interpreting ordinances which are subject to the same statutory construction.) 
The Defendant's strained interpretation of rule 11 violates every rule of construction, 
including that rule which states if it is not ambiguous no construction is necessary. Rule 11 is 
straight forward and unambiguous. It states no brief .... shall be filed. No construction is 
necessary. 
The worker's compensation law in Idaho is to be construed in favor of the injured 
worker. Thus, any interpretation which inures to the benefit of the claimant is required. 
The principle often stated is that workmen's compensation provisions are to be construed 
liberally in favor of the claimant. Miller v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 105 Idaho 725, 672 P.2d 
1055 (1983) 
The liberal construction principle has been applied in several cases to determine whether 
an employee is entitled to a particular benefit. In these cases the Court has frequently construed 
statutes in a manner that favors the award of benefits. Flock v. J.e. Palumbo Fruit Co., 63 
Idaho 220, 242, 118 P.2d 707, 716 (1941). 
Claimant's Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief 5 
Not only is the Defendant's interpretation of rule 11 improper under a statutory 
construction analysis, it would violate the liberal construction requirement under the worker's 
compensation law. 
Finally, in response to Mr. Pappas claim that he was "surprised", it must be pointed out 
that Mr. Masingill was never advised by Mr. Pappas of his "interpretation of the rule. Mr. 
Masingill did not speak with Mr. Pappas about this at any time whatsoever. The only 
communication took place by Mr. Masingill's secretary calling Mr. Pappas' office asking if he 
would object to a motion to include more than thirty pages in the claimant's initial brief. Mr. 
Pappas' office responded that "he would have to ask his client". Mr. Masingill was home ill that 
day and was advised by his secretary of Mr. Pappas' response. Mr. Masingill's instructed his 
secretary to respond that there was no need to "ask his client", and that the brief would be 
reduced in length. Any implication in the Defendant's motion whatsoever that Mr. Masingill 
was advised of the Defendant's interpretation of the rule is inaccurate. 
Claimant requests attorney's fees and costs for having to respond to this frivolous motion. 
Dated: July 16, 2009. 
asingill 
Attorney for Claimant 
Leisa Knowlton 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY certify that on Ju1y 16, 2009, I caused to serve a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Claimant's Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief in the above referenced case by 
first class u.s. mail, postage prepaid, and by electronic mail upon the following: 
Matthew Pappas 
Anderson, Julian & Hu1I, LLP 
POBox 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LESIA KNOWLTON, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) IC 2000-030269 
v. ) 
) 
WOOD RNER MEDICAL CENTER, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
Employer, ) AND RECOMMENDATION 
and ) 
) 
FREMONT COMPENSATION ) 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ) FILED 
) 
Surety, ) NOV - 3 2009 
and ) 
) IN8USTlllAL COMMISSION 
IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY ) 
ASSOCIATION, ) 




Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned this 
matter to Referee Douglas A. Donohue. He conducted a hearing in Hailey on June 20, 2008. 
Christ T. Troupis and R. Brad Masingill represented Claimant. Matthew Pappas represented 
Defendants. The parties presented oral and documentary evidence. Due to the large number 
of witnesses, the record was held open for the taking of additional depositions. The parties 
submitted briefs. The case came under advisement one year later on July 15, 2009. It is now 
ready for decision. 
ISSUES 
The issues to be resolved according to the amended notice of hearing are: 
1. Whether the condition for which Claimant is seeking benefits was caused 
by the alleged industrial accident; 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION -1 
2. Whether apportionment for a preexisting condition pursuant to Idaho code 
72-406 is appropriate; 
3. Whether Claimant is medically stable and, if so, when; and 
4. Whether and to what extent claimant is entitled to: 
a. Temporary disability (TTD), 
b. Pennanent impainnent (PPI), 
c. Permanent disability, 
d. Retraining, 
e. Medical care benefits, and 
f Attorney fees. 
Defendants moved to strike Claimant's reply brief as being overlong under Commission 
Rules. Without comment on the merits of the varying interpretation of the Rules, Defendants' 
motion is Denied. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Claimant contends she was exposed to an odor for several hours at work. The odor came 
from the improper use of chemical, probably sulfuric acid, to unstop a plugged toilet or bathroom 
floor drain. She suffered injury to her lungs. She has been unable to work around any odor 
since. She is totally disabled as an odd-lot worker. Defendants' actions give rise to her 
entitlement to an attorney fee award. 
Defendants contend Claimant was not actually injured by the odor. She has failed to 
prove it caused any lung injury. The symptoms Claimant complains of are a result of 
longstanding asthma exacerbated by gastroesophageal reflux disease ("GERD"). Her inability 
to tolerate benign odors demonstrates the existence of a psychological component to her 
symptoms which is unrelated to the accident. She is not entitled to benefits. Moreover, 
Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association ("the Fund") is not liable for medical payments previously 
reimbursed by any third-party payer and is not liable for attorney fees by statute, 
Idaho Code § 41-3605(7). 
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EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in the instant case consists of the following: 
1. Hearing testimony of Claimant, and of toxicologist Stephen Munday, 
M.D.; 
2. Claimant's Exhibits 35 - 57; 
3. Defendants' Exhibits 1 - 34; 
4. Posthearing depositions of Claimant's father Warren "Dan" Gorringe, 
Claimant's husband David Knowlton, and former employee Jay Brown; 
5. Posthearing depositions of expert witnesses pUlmonologist Holly Carveth, 
M.D.; allergy and immunologist and treating physician Ronald Fullmer, 
M.D.; neuropsychologist Craig Beaver, Ph.D.; vocational rehabilitation 
experts Douglas A. Donohue Cmm and Barbara Nelson. 
After examining the evidence, the Referee submits the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendation for review by the Commission. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Claimant worked for Employer as a unit secretary. On September 12, 2000, 
she was working at her station when a maintenance man used a chemical to unstop a toilet 
or bathroom floor drain in a patient's room. The chemical caused a foul odor which 
Claimant described as an "orange citrusy" smell "like an air freshener." Hospital staff 
ventilated the area by placing a portable fan in the doorway of the patient's room. 
Combined with other fans which were always present, the smelly air blew past Claimant's 
station for the rest of her shift. Claimant recalls that the odor "got stronger and stronger" as 
the day wore on. Claimant also recalls smelling another odor, like "rotten eggs," coming 
from the kitchen around lunchtime. This odor was not as strong around her work station. 
She recalls kitchen personnel telling her that smell was coming up through the drains. 
2. After several people complained about the "citrusy" odor, Claimant began calling 
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supervisors and others to ameliorate the odor. The director of nurses and the infection control 
nurse conferred and moved a patient from the room where the chemical was used to 
another part of the hospital. 
3. Claimant recalls that she heard at least one person complain that the odor was 
giving her a headache. Claimant developed her first symptom, a headache, later that day. 
4. In a 2003 deposition, Claimant first recalled that she worked from just after 
8:00 a.m. until 11 :30 p.m. She described in detail taking a meal break about 7:00 p.m. and 
noticing that her lungs burned as she took deep breaths in the cold outdoor air. By the date 
of hearing, after reviewing documents, she recalled that she worked only until about 4:00 p.m. 
She recalls that by the time she finished her shift and got horne, she had developed a cough 
and body aches. She recalls that by the next morning she had a productive cough. 
5. Claimant arrived to work her regular shift the day following the exposure. 
As the day progressed, her symptoms worsened. She arranged to be relieved around lunchtime. 
She also worked only a partial day on the next day as well. 
6. The exposure occurred on a Tuesday. Claimant first sought medical attention 
on Friday. On September 15, 2000, she visited Laria Thomas, F.N.P. Nurse Thomas 
recorded Claimant complained of a "cough, sore throat, burning when she takes a breath." 
Examination revealed "Posterior pharynx is trace injection. Minimal submandibular 
lymphadenopathy bilaterally. Clear bilateral breath sounds." Nurse Thomas prescribed 
antibiotics, cough syrup and an inhaler. A chest X-ray taken on a follow up visit showed 
was normal. 
7. When Claimant returned to work on Monday, she completed an accident report. 
At that time, Claimant was told the chemical used to unstop the toilet was sulfuric acid. 
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A material safety data sheet ("MSDS") describes hazards associated with a sulfuric acid 
containing product called Biotron. Claimant doubts whether Employer has produced the 
MSDS for the actual product she smelled on the date of the exposure. 
8. Claimant recalls she developed voice problems during the week following 
her first medical visit. This memory is unsubstantiated by medical records. "Hoarseness" 
first appears in the medical records one month after the exposure. 
9. On September 25, 2000, Claimant visited Thomas Pryor, M.D. The only 
complaint he recorded was a cough. On exam, Claimant was normal except for the cough 
and bronchitis in her lungs. Her sinuses were normal. Dr. Thomas described bronchitis 
which Claimant had linked to the exposure. On a September 28, 2000 follow-up visit, 
Claimant reported she had developed a sore chest from coughing and a sore throat. 
On examination, Dr. Pryor noted "pretty impressive inflammation" in her sinuses. He provided 
a release from work. 
"improved profoundly." 
By October 4, Dr. Pryor noted Claimant's inflammation had 
10. On October 4, 2000, Nurse Thomas provided Claimant a release from work 
retroactive to the date of the exposure. 
11. On October 5, 2000, Claimant telephoned Nurse Thomas and reported a second 
exposure, this time to "some cleaners" at work which, Claimant reported had caused a flare up. 
12. On October 13, 2000, Claimant visited Ronald Fullmer, M.D. She complained 
of shortness of breath and hoarseness. A history taken at that visit noted Claimant began 
smoking cigarettes "less than" one year earlier. She reported a "burning" in her nasal 
passages occurred at the time of the September 12, 2000 exposure but had resolved. 
On examination, Dr. Fullmer noted that Claimant's vocal distortion became more normal 
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when she was "off the topic" of the exposure. Her head, eyes, ears, nose, and throat were 
all objectively normal, as was her breathing. 
13. On October 25, 2000, Nurse Thomas prescribed Wellbutrin at Claimant's 
request to help her stop smoking. 
14. On December 11, 2000, Claimant reported to Nurse Thomas that she 
experienced two episodes of reactions to food. Claimant inquired about MSG or some 
sulfa-containing component to the food. She described eye and skin symptoms. These 
symptoms were not noted in the record of her examination that day. An issue of sulfites 
in food arose after Claimant began her own internet research. No medical provider has 
opined that other sulfur-containing chemicals are clinically related to sulfuric acid in a way that 
might exacerbate symptoms caused by exposure to the latter. 
15. By the time of her December 20, 2000 visit to Dr. Fullmer, she had developed 
new symptoms which she attributed to new triggers. On examination, Dr. Fullmer again 
found all relevant systems to be objectively normal. He opined, "It seems quite unlikely that 
she would have persistent inflammation or injury related to the exposure 3Yz months ago." 
He attributed her symptoms to "anxiety." Later, Dr. Fullmer opined that Claimant suffered 
a "minor to mild injury" which lasted "possibly of a prolonged duration of perhaps" four to 
six weeks. He opined that any injury or symptoms lasted no more than four to six weeks. 
He opined that her increasing, multiple complaints were not related to the exposure but 
were possibly related to very mild asthma, secondary gain, or anxiety. He opined her 
vocal symptoms were "psychogenic." He rated her as having no restrictions and no PPI. 
16. Claimant recalls that the inhaler which was prescribed made her nauseated, 
dizzy, and gave her a headache. Dr. Fullmer's record addressed the possibility that a steroid 
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inhaler could exacerbate some throat discomfort. The steroid inhaler was discontinued. 
17. On December 27, 2000, Claimant first visited Richard E. Henry, M.D. 
From this visit forward, Claimant provided her treating physicians with a history which was 
materially inconsistent with the medical records generated in September and October 2000. 
18. In the weeks and months after the exposure, Claimant continued to develop 
additional symptoms whenever she came near an ever-expanding list of triggering odors. 
She developed bouts of hives and body rashes, watery eyes, scratchy throat, sinus swelling 
and runny nose, dental problems, and other symptoms. She came to link various combinations 
of symptoms to exposure to cold air, motor vehicle exhaust-both gasoline and diesel, 
animal dander, pollens, dust, soaps and cleaning products, perfumes and scents in grooming 
products, the smell of marking pens, industrial chemicals used for farm machinery 
maintenance, consumption of alcohol and many foods, wood smoke and other people's 
cigarette smoke, etc. Incongruously, she occasionally smoked cigarettes while driving but 
reported no breathing or other problems when doing so. 
19. Specific allergen testing by pinprick to her back produced negative results for 
every pollen, dander, and chemical tested. 
Prior Medical History 
20. In 1988 at age 18, Claimant was examined by Dr. Fullmer. Among her 
Complaints, she included mild dyspnea. Dr. Fullmer testified he considered differential 
diagnoses including chronic bronchitis and early asthma, but believed depression was the 
more likely cause. 
21. In 1997 and 1998, Claimant reported a two-year history of intermittent irritability 
and fatigue. Claimant suspected a thyroid problem. 
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22. According to her reports to doctors, Claimant began smoking sometime 
between August 25, 1998 and April 13, 1999. Claimant inconsistently reported her smoking 
habits after the exposure. 
23. On May 28, 1999, Claimant visited Nurse Thomas and complained of eye and 
nose symptoms related to mowing the lawn. Nurse Thomas diagnosed allergic rhinitis. 
Physicians' Opinions 
24. In deposition, treating physician Ronald Fullmer, M.D., opined Claimant's 
symptoms were inconsistent with exposure to inhaled sulfuric acid. He considered GERD 
to be the more likely cause. He considered differential diagnoses of mild asthma and anxiety 
to be more likely than reactive airways dysfunction syndrome ("RADS"). He opined that the 
onset of increasing symptoms in the weeks after the exposure was more likely evidence of 
a psychological component. He held to his opinions expressed in his medical records in 2000. 
Dr. Fullmer explained his reasons underlying his opinions. Giving the Claimant the benefit 
of any possible doubt, he opined Claimant became medically stable from any possible 
inhalation injury within six weeks of the exposure. 
25. Nurse Thomas was sympathetic with the diagnosis of RADS, but declined 
to express an opinion. 
26. Holly Carveth, M.D., IS a pUlmonologist. She first examined Claimant on 
January 9, 2001. She opined Clamant suffered from RADS as a result of the inhalation 
exposure. She opined Claimant also suffered from Irritable Larynx Syndrome. She opined 
Claimant's vocal cord dysfunction was related to anxiety and acid reflux. She opined the 
acid reflux was exacerbated by Claimant's cough which was caused by the inhalation exposure. 
Dr. Carveth's opinions would not be changed if the chemical to which Claimant was exposed 
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was something other than sulfuric acid. Dr. Carveth opined that the presence of the fans 
concentrated the irritant which Claimant inhaled during the exposure. 
27. William W. Wallace, M.D., specializes in allergy immunology. On September 30, 
2005, he conducted allergen testing by pinprick on Claimant's back. He opined she exhibited 
no allergic reaction to any of the potential allergens for which he tested: pollens, dander, etc. 
He opined she had no allergies related to possible sulfuric acid exposure. He denied the 
existence of a potential link between sulfites and Claimant's reported reactions to foods. 
28. On September 30, 2005, Stephen W. Munday, M.D., evaluated Claimant 
at Defendants' request. Dr. Munday specializes in occupational environmental medicine 
and toxicology. He opined Claimant does not suffer from RADS. Dr. Munday is well 
familiar with the criteria required for a diagnosis of RADS and has discussed it with the 
doctor that first described and named the condition. Claimant's history does not meet the 
criteria for a diagnosis of RADS. Dr. Munday opined Claimant's symptoms which 
developed more than a few days after the exposure are not related to the exposure. 
Noting that Claimant reported throat and lung symptoms but not eye and nose symptoms, 
Dr. Munday opined these reported symptoms were inconsistent with an inhalation exposure 
and were consistent with a diagnosis of GERD. He opined that the multiple tests Claimant 
has undergone do not show it probable that Claimant suffers from asthma. 
29. In August 2007, Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D., performed a neuropsychological IME 
at Defendants' request. He performed tests over a two-day visit with Claimant. He opined 
inhalation exposure was not the predominate cause of Claimant's symptoms initially and 
was not a probable cause of her later-appearing symptoms. He attributed her later-appearing 
symptoms as probably psychologically, not physically, caused. He opined that asthma was 
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known to be related to somatization and that Claimant developed a "conditioned relationship" 
of exhibiting symptoms as a result of emotional distress, anxiety, and depression, all of which 
stemmed from a naIve personality. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS OF FACT 
30. Credibility - Claimant. Claimant's demeanor was most notable for her 
vocal distortion when she became emotional. From the outset of the hearing, she spoke with 
a tight, high-pitched voice. This came and went during questioning but was most clearly 
brought on when she described emotionally charged events which brought her near tears. 
Claimant became tearful and exhibited vocal distortion when describing events that brought 
her sorrow and when describing events which brought her frustration. This demeanor 
exhibited more than a few times during her testimony at hearing. It was most notably absent 
at times when she became argumentative with the cross-examiner. 
31. Claimant's testimony demonstrates she casually shifted from recalled fact to 
speculation without being aware she had done so. In her attempts to answer questions, it is 
impossible to separate actual memory from her supposed guesses at what might have happened. 
32. Materially significant portions of her testimony were internally inconsistent 
among her 2003 deposition, her 2004 deposition, and her 2008 hearing testimony. This is 
not to say that Claimant deliberately lied. On the contrary, she appeared to attempt honesty 
at all times. However, over time her memory has become so confabulated with the story of her 
illness that no part of her memory ofthese events or her symptoms can be accepted at face value. 
33. Concerning her symptoms, treatment, and conversations with her medical 
providers, Claimant's testimony is materially inconsistent with that of the physicians 
who treated or examined her. To the extent inconsistency arises, medical records and the 
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physician's memory and testimony is given greater weight. 
34. Other Witnesses. Claimant's recollection of conversations with vanous 
co-workers is materially inconsistent with the memories of the co-workers. Again, where 
relevant to dispositive issues, the testimony of co-workers is given greater weight. 
35. A parade of family members and co-workers testified that before the date of 
the exposure, Claimant was without symptoms and was a hard worker. They testified that 
afterward, Claimant exhibited breathing, vocal, or other symptoms. Testimony concerning 
these points is credible. 
36. Causation. A claimant must provide medical testimony that supports a claim for 
compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Langley v. State, Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 785, 890 P.2d 732, 736 (1995). "Probable" is defined as 
"having more evidence for than against." Fisher v. Bunker Hill Company, 96 Idaho 341, 
344,528 P.2d 903, 906 (1974). The exposure itself is problematic. An unknown chemical 
of unknown strength was blown by fans a distance of over 15 feet down a hallway past 
the place where Claimant sat. The best evidence of record suggests the chemical irritant was 
likely sulfuric acid. Claimant provided only hearsay testimony that at least one person other 
than herself reported a headache that day. No other co-workers were reportedly harmed in 
any way. Claimant reported that she smelled two separate odors, one coming from the 
patient's room and the other coming from the kitchen. Moreover, records show that 
Claimant reported she experienced symptomatic reactions on two other occasions - October 4 
and October 30 - to the smell of cleansers which were being used by co-workers. These 
cleansers were not shown to be in any way toxic. These subsequent episodes were merely 
the first ofthe myriad smells Claimant asserts she became sensitized to. 
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37. Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome, ("RADS") was first described in 1985. 
RADS is a subset or form of asthma. Among the clinical criteria required for a RADS diagnosis 
are the "documented absence of preceding respiratory complaints ... very high concentrations 
[of chemical irritant, and] ... onset of symptoms occurred within 24 hours after the exposure 
and persisted for at least three months." Each of these factors is equivocal or absent according 
to the medical records of treating physicians. 
38. Dr. Munday's thorough report and testimony was persuaSIve. No external 
chemical, whether sulfuric acid or another irritant, could likely have caused Claimant's lung 
and throat symptoms without first significantly buming her eyes and nose. The medical 
records nearest the exposure noted that Claimant's most significant complaint was a cough. 
Referring to the day of the exposure, there is a passing reference to a burning sensation 
in Claimant's nose but no mention of eye irritation. By context, if either her eyes or 
nasal passages had been significantly burned, there would likely have been a more prominent 
mention of it, and the examination would likely have revealed injury to those organs. 
He explained how GERD was more consistent than chemical inhalation. Dr. Munday also 
explained why GERD was the likely cause of Claimant's cough and burning sensation in 
her lungs and throat. 
39. The opinions of treating physician Dr. Fullmer and expert toxicologist 
Dr. Munday are consistent with each other. Together, they establish that Claimant's exposure 
on September 12, 2000 did not cause any symptoms or condition which would have 
reasonably required medical care. 
40. However, this set of facts exposes a troubling proposition. Claimant genuinely 
believed she had been exposed to a toxin. An actual event made this belief reasonable. 
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Employer was unable to immediately identify the chemical to which she had been exposed. 
The policy of "sure and certain relief' for injured workers suggests that a worker in this 
circumstance should not be strictly liable for the cost of initial diagnosis and treatment if 
she is wrong about such an event being the cause of her symptoms. Throughout the rest 
of September and October 2000, Nurse Thomas, Dr. Pryor, and Dr. Fullmer all provided 
reasonable medical care related to the exposure, even though the event was ultimately 
determined not to have caused Claimant's condition. Dr. Fullmer acted cautiously in opining at 
the time of treatment that Claimant's symptoms were probably related to the exposure. 
Dr. Fullmer's abundance of caution in his initial assessments of Claimant are sufficient to 
allow Claimant medical benefits for that initial six -week period. 
41. Claimant is not entitled to temporary total or partial disability benefits because 
this was found to be a noncompensable claim. While the Commission is awarding medical care 
for the initial six -week period, we have found Claimant is entitled to medical care as an expense 
of investigating the compensability of the claim. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Claimant failed to show that the symptoms for which she sought medical 
attention probably were related to the exposure to odor she experienced on September 12, 2000. 
2. Claimant's medical treatment for the six weeks following the September 12,2000 
exposure was a reasonably related precautionary to exposure by an unknown airborne irritant 
and therefore, Claimant is entitled to medical benefits for that period only. 
3. Claimant failed to show she was entitled to temporary disability benefits or 
any other workers' compensation benefits. 
4. All other issues are moot. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
The Referee recommends that the Commission adopt the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as its own and issue an appropriate final order. 
DATED this /6 j~ay of October, 2009. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
l~ 
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INIUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-717, Referee Douglas A. Donohue submitted the record 
in the above-entitled matter, together with his recommended findings of fact and conclusions 
of law to the members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review. Each of the 
undersigned Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendations of the Referee. 
The Commission concurs with these recommendations. Therefore, the Commission approves, 
confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed fmdings of fact and conclusions oflaw as its own. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Claimant failed to show that the symptoms for which she sought medical 
attention probably were related to the exposure to odor she experienced on September 12,2000. 
2. Claimant's medical treatment for the six weeks following the September 12, 2000 
exposure was a reasonably related precautionary to exposure by an unknown airborne irritant 
and therefore, Claimant is entitled to medical benefits for that period only. 
ORDER-l 
3. Claimant failed to show she was entitled to temporary disability benefits or 
any other workers' compensation benefits. 
4. All other issues are moot. 
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COME NOW, the above-named Claimant, Lesia Knowlton, by and through her 
attorney's of record, R. Brad Masingill and Christ T. Troupis, and hereby moves for 
reconsideration of the Order entered by the Commission in this case on November 3, 2009 
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-718. This motion is based upon the grounds that the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and recommendations of the Referee Douglas A. Donohue and the Order 
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration 1 
entered by the Commission thereon are not based on substantial competent evidence, and the 
findings do not as a matter of law support the order and award. 
Dated: November 19,2009. 
~ 
Christ T. Troupis~ 
Attorney for Claimant 
Leisa Knowlton 
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration 2 
? __ ("'J 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY certify that on November 19, 2009, I caused to serve a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration in the above referenced case by first class 
u.s. mail, postage prepaid, and by electronic mail upon the following: 
Matthew Pappas 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
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IC No.: 00-030269 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT 
TO IDAHO CODE §72-718 
m 
0 
COME NOW, the above-named Claimant, Lesia Knowlton, by and through her 
attorney's of record, R. Brad Masingill and Christ T. Troupis, and submits the following 
Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order entered by the 
Commission in this case on November 3, 2009. 
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I 
THE EVIDENCE PROVED THAT THE CLAIMANT'S 
SYMPTOMS WERE RELATED TO THE INHALATION EXPOSURE 
SHE EXPERIENCED ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2000 
A. There is no support for the finding that Lesia Knowlton's symptoms were due to 
pre-existing asthma or Gastric Esophageal Reflux Disease, "GERD." 
1. No pre-existing asthma. 
There was no medical evidence that Lesia Knowlton was ever diagnosed with asthma or 
treated for respiratory problems of any kind prior to the 9112/00 exposure. The only oblique 
reference to such an issue was in Dr. Fullmer's office note for one visit in November, 1988, 
twelve (12) years prior to the chemical exposure. Lesia Knowlton was eighteen (18) at the time, 
and saw Dr. Fullmer because she 'sleeps too long.' Dr. Fullmer made the following note in the 
history he took that day. "Pt. plays volleyball and states that she is able to keep up with her piers 
as far as exercise. She does have occasional mild dyspnea with running after her brother, but 
denies other problems." Ex. 2, p. 1 Dr. Fullmer Assessment did not include any finding of 
asthma, and he ultimately concluded that Lesia Knowlton's physical condition was entirely 
normal. He testified: 
"Q: And do you recall from maybe looking at your notes, did the physical exam reveal 
any significant objective findings? 
A: No. I think her physical exam was normal, as far as her chest goes. I think her breath 
sounds were good. And I don't think she had any wheezing. You know, basically, my 
note says that her chest exam was normal." RF Depo, p. 11, lines 4-11. 
In his Assessment, Dr. Fullmer noted that there was no evidence of cardiac lesions, and 
no historical evidence to go along with intrinsic pulmonary disease. Exh. 2, p. 3 Although Dr. 
Fullmer noted the presence of "Clubbing," that finding was in error, because subsequent physical 
exams by Dr. Carveth and defense expert, Dr. William Wallace both disclosed no clubbing. Exh. 
Claimant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 2 
~fl 
17, p. 2; WW Depo., p. 15, line 19 - 22. "And incidentally noted we did not find any clubbing of 
the ends of her digits or fmgers, which would indicate chrome lung disease, which wasn't there." 
Defense expert, Dr. Stephen Munday, admitted in his testimony at the hearing that Lesia 
Knowlton was never diagnosed with asthma prior to the exposure. He said: 
"Q: Now, do the records that - the medical records that you reviewed for Mrs. Knowlton 
show any - were there ever any indications in the record that she had any asthmatic 
condition or asthma prior to September 12, 2000? 
A: Well, there has never been any records that I have seen anywhere that gave her a 
diagnosis of asthma, so I would agree with that statement." Tr. p. 166, lines 10- 16. 
2. No pre-existing GERD. 
Lesia Knowlton was not diagnosed with GERD at any time prior to the exposure on 
9/12/00. Dr. Fullmer testified: 
"Q: And did she have any preexisting symptoms of GERD that had been disclosed in her 
records? 
A: I really didn't get a history of any significant gastroesophageal reflux disease." RF 
Depo., p. 53, lines 12 - 16. 
She was only diagnosed with GERD after Dr. Carveth had concluded she was suffering 
from Reactive Airways Disease Syndrome, "RADS." That diagnosis occurred four months after 
the exposure, in January, 2001. Dr. Carveth testified that the medical records of the 
laryngoscopy examination of Lesia Knowlton's vocal cords on January 10,2001 do not mention 
any findings ofGERD. There were no physical lesions or scars. HC Depo., p. 75, lines 14-15. 
Dr. Carveth noted in her medical record that "They did not notice acid injury to her vocal cords." 
Exh. 17, p. 15 ("Tissue appears healthy at this time and there is no evidence of any damage.") 
Exh. 17, p. 17 ("No mass lesions. No other lesions or abnormalities in the laryngopharynx.") Dr. 
Carveth testified that ifLesia had severe GERD prior to that time, there would have been some 
evidence of acid injury to her vocal cords. HC Depo., p. 113, line 21 - p. 114, line 15. 
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Lesia Knowlton told her treating physicians that she had an acid taste in her mouth when 
she was exposed to the toxic odors on 9/12/00. Dr. Fullmer testified that it was not very likely 
that the acid taste was indicative of the 'early onset of GERD.' 
"Q: Doctor, could the acid taste in Claimant's throat also be a possible sign of a different 
condition? 
A: Well, sure, you could postulate other things. 
Q: Is it possible she was maybe suffering from the early onset of GERD? 
A: Well, acid reflux disease could cause burning in the person's throat, I mean, if they 
had major reflux where they were having acid come all the way up the back of their 
throat. They could even - and most typically, that would occur at night when the person 
is asleep and can't protect their airway as well and could have acid all the way up in their 
mouth and nose. But that's pretty rare to see that. For a person to have that while they're 
alert and awake, and not have known significant severe acid reflux disease, it's probably 
not very likely." (RF Depo., p. 18, lines 2 - 20.) 
All of the medical evidence supports the conclusion that Lesia Knowlton's coughing 
caused her to develop an acid reflux problem, including the absence of any prior diagnosis of 
GERD, the fact that it did not develop until four months after the exposure, and the fact that 
Lesia Knowlton had severe and uncontrollable coughing fits that started with the exposure. Dr. 
Holly Carveth testified that "It's common that severe coughing episodes can bring out GERD." 
HC Deposition, p. 19, Ll. 17 - 25. She also testified that: 
"At times, GERD can be either brought on or worsened if someone gets into a situation 
with a lot of coughing. And we see that actually sometimes post-operatively or someone 
gets a lung infection ... .I would say that cough can cause and cough can worsen GERD. 
The increased intraabdominal pressure can cause acid to go up into the esophagus when 
previously that wasn't a problem .... So I wouldn't say that acid is the problem, but cough 
or extreme chest tightness, struggling to breathe, that. .. can physiologically produce it." 
HC Depo., p. 85, line 19 - p. 87, line 1. 
It is undisputed that Lesia's coughing started with her exposure on 9112/00 and was a 
direct result of that exposure. Lesia was exposed to the chemical fumes on Tuesday, September 
12,2000 and saw Laira Thomas, a nurse practitioner, on Friday, September 15,2000. Exh. 5, p. 
13. Her Assessment was "Cough possibly related to chemical exposure at work." 
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She saw Dr. Thomas Pryor on September 25, 2000, ten days after the exposure. He noted 
that her cough was so severe anytime she increases her respiratory rate, that she cannot function. 
Dr. Pryor's diagnostic assessment was "toxic exposure to sulfuric acid, accidental, with 
secondary bronchitis. Exh. 9, p. 5. 
It is also likely that GERD developed in part because Lesia Knowlton was put on steroids 
by Dr. Pryor and gained 40 pounds. She reported the first onset of acid reflux after this weight 
gain and a month prior to her visit with Dr. Carveth in January, 2001. Ex. 17, p. 9. 
B. The evidence shows that the exposure occurred and caused Lesia Knowlton's 
symptoms. 
1. Evidence of Ms. Knowlton's exposure was undisputed. 
Lesia Knowlton's testimony and the corroborating testimony of Joyce Fogg about the 
presence of strong odors at her nurse's station was undisputed in the record. Ms. Knowlton 
testified, 
"I didn't really notice that it was toxic, so to speak, it just - the longer you sat there and 
smelled it - at first it started getting real annoying, because you couldn't get the smell out 
of the air. Later, one of the nurses had come up the hall and said, man, that stuff reeks. 
What is that smell? And 1 didn't think anything of it. Later she came back said we need to 
call infection control have her come and do something about this smell." 
Ir. 29, line 23 - p. 30, line 18. 
Lesia called Jodi Alverson and left a message for her to check out the odor. Patient's 
families were coming in and complaining of the smelly odor. Tr. 30, line 20 - 25. Lesia was 
starting to get a headache from it. Tr. 31, lines 16-17. Then prior to lunch, Jodi came in and 
talked to maintenance and told Lesia they needed to transfer the elderly woman in Room 7 to 
Room 19. Tr. 31, line 22 - p. 32, line 15. 
Just prior to lunchtime, a second odor, "like rotten eggs," started emanating from the 
drain trap in the kitchen, two doors further down the hall. One of the kitchen staff came out and 
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was pretty upset because of the stink. Tr. 43, lines 9 - 23. Joyce Fogg, one of the nurses on staff, 
recalled the egg smell that day. She testified that it was a strong smell that would have been by 
the nurse's station. In fact, she only noticed it in the nurse's area. Exh. 24, JF Deposition, p. 11, 
line 17 - p. 12, line 19; p. 16, lines 1 - 11. 
2. The medical records and witness testimony prove that Lesia Knowlton had 
immediate respiratory symptoms resulting from her exposure. 
The medical records corroborate Ms. Knowlton's respiratory issues. Laira Thomas initial 
visit notes three days after the exposure on September 15,2000: "She comes in today 
complaining of cough, sore throat, burning when she takes a deep breath." Exh. 5, p. 13. She saw 
Dr. Thomas Pryor two weeks after the incident on September 25, 2000: "She had some problems 
with coughing at the time and developed progressive coughing and hacking, which has persisted 
since that time .... The cough is so severe any time she increases her respiratory rate, she cannot 
function .... On exam no distress, she just gets into severe hacking, coughing fits ... The lungs have 
some bronchitis-like sounds to them, but no focal findings. There is some increased expiratory 
phase noted. Some scattered ronchi, but no wheezes." Exh. 9, p. 5. 
Lesia Knowlton and three other witnesses all testified that her voice was hoarse. Joyce 
Fogg, a nurse at the hospital testified that she noticed that Lesia's voice was hoarse after that 
day, but not before then. Exh. 24, JF Deposition, p. 14, lines 3 - 6. 
Lesia's husband, David, came home to find Lesia lying on the couch. He said: 
" ... you could hear pneumonia, you could hear gurgling in her chest ... The day before, 
very upbeat and going. I mean, just herself. Not sitting still. I knew something was wrong 
when I came home that day that it happened and she was laying on the couch. Because 
she was never home that early in the day .... She was white and pasty. Like sweaty. And 
when she'd breathe or try to talk, she couldn't talk she was hoarse. And when I got over 
next to her, you could hear the breathing was wheezing. It was really labored .... Very, 
very difficult for her to breathe." DK deposition, p. 10, line 19 - p. 11, line 19. 
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Lesia's father came over to Lesia's home that day. He said, "Well, she was on the couch 
when we got there. And, you know, wheezing. She couldn't hardly breathe. She said she had her 
lungs bumt ... She had, you know, glassy eyes, watery eyes, yeah. Was wiping them .... She could 
kind of [talk], like a whisper." WDG deposition, p. 15, line 9 - p. 16, line 3. 
Although another defense witness, Karen Exon, wasn't working on September 12,2000, 
she testified that after that date, she noticed a change in Lesia's voice. She described it as soft, 
hoarse and raspy. Exh. 25, KE Depo., p. 17, line 13 - p. 19, line 2. 
n 
LESIA KNOWLTON CONTRACTED RADS 
AS A RESULT OF HER INHALATION INJURY 
A. The medical records support the conclusion that Lesia Knowlton contracted 
Reactive Airway Disease Syndrome "RADS" as a result of her inhalation injury. 
Wikipedia defines RADS as follows: 
"Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome or RADS (also known as Reactive Airway 
Disease or RAD) is a term proposed by S.M. Brooks and colleagues in 1985 to describe 
an asthma-like syndrome developing after a single exposure to high levels of an irritating 
vapor, fume, or smoke. In time, however, it has evolved to be mistakenly used as a 
synonym for asthma. 
It can also manifest in adults with exposure to high levels of chlorine, ammonia, acetic 
acid, sulphur dioxide, creating symptoms like asthma. The severity of these symptoms 
can be mild to fatal, and can even create long term airway damage depending on the 
amount of exposure and the concentration of Chlorine. Some experts classifY RADS as 
occupational asthma." 
1. RADS was diagnosed by three (3) treating physicians. 
Lesia Knowlton was diagnosed with RADS by three (3) treating physicians: Dr. Ronald 
Fullmer, Dr. Richard Henry, and Dr. Holly Carveth. Each of these physicians also related her 
RADS symptoms to the occupational exposure. 
Lesia Knowlton saw Dr. Fullmer in October, November and December following her 
exposure. In his 11120100 Assessment, Dr. Fullmer noted that the reduction in airflow measured 
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on spirometry exam could have some reactive airways dysfunction syndrome.Exh. 2, p. 11. 
When asked in his deposition if smoking could explain Lesia Knowlton's spirometry exam 
results, Dr. Fullmer responded that the results were more indicative ofRADS: 
"Q: What effect would smoking have on these tests? 
A: Smoking could cause the reduction in the FEF 25-75. But if it was, for example, early 
emphysema-related smoking, I wouldn't expect to see the significant improvement after 
the bronchodilator, which she did have. That is more suggestive of reactive airways 
disease like asthma or Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome or something like that." 
RF Depo., p. 33, lines 2 - 11. 
Dr. Fullmer referred Lesia to Dr. Richard Henry, an allergist, who saw her a week later 
on December 27, 2000. Dr. Henry's impression was: 
"1. Reactive airways dysfunction syndrome suggested by history. At this point she seems 
to have heightened nonspecific hyperreactivity of her upper and lower airways. Although 
prior history does not suggest prior atopy, she does have a brother with asthma and hay 
fever and is therefore at higher risk for developing asthma. From her history, there 
appears to be an initial occupational contribution and now an ongoing occupational 
aggravation when exposed to hospital chemicals (disinfectants, cleaning agents, etc.) 
2. Tobacco abuse, minimal." Exh. 10, p. 2. 
Ms. Knowlton was then seen by Dr. Holly Carveth, a pulmonary specialist at University 
of Utah Hospital. She sees many cases ofRADS every year. HC Depo., p. 30, line 13 -14 Ms. 
Knowlton was treated at the University of Utah Hospital by Dr. Holly Carveth from January 9, 
2001 through August 3,2004. Dr. Carveth diagnosed Lesia Knowlton's condition as RADS. She 
said the symptoms may improve "over months to years." Lesia underwent a Methacholine 
Challenge Test, in which her FEV 1 dramatically declined to 69% of predicted. Dr. Carveth 
noted that this test was abnormal, which supported the diagnosis. Exh. 17, p. 3 
2. Multiple Methacholine Challenge Tests Corroborate the RAnS Diagnosis. 
The eleven (11) Methacholine Challenge Tests taken by Lesia Knowlton over a six year 
period consistently show that Lesia Knowlton suffers from RADS, irritant induced asthma. All 
of the tests are consistent and show a moderate degree of airway hyperresponsiveness. Exh. 18 
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All of them, even according to defense expert, Dr. Munday, showed that she as in the "low end 
to moderate reactivity." Tr. p. 165, line 16 - p. 166, line 9. Dr. Munday agreed that Lesia 
Knowlton's tests showed a 20% drop on multiple occasions. 
" ... they look for a 20 percent drop from the baseline testing and what they do is they 
keep giving a higher dose until either get to a 20 percent drop or they reach the maximum 
dose. In the case of Mrs. Knowlton, she did have a positive test in that she did have a 20 
percent drop and as it said multiply - on different occasions, they were in the same 
general range and they were all up in the moderate range." Tr. p. 151, lines 8 -15. 
Dr. Carveth testified that the test administered on January 9, 2001 showed her lung 
capacity had a "dramatic decline to 69% of predicted." Exh. 17, p. 3 
Dr. Carveth testified about how difficult it would be to falsify these test results, especially 
in light of the repeatedly consistent results over the years. She testified: 
" ... the Defendant's expert at the hearing testified that those kinds of tests can, from time 
to time, have false positives. I don't know whether you agree with that, but my question 
to you is, would it be reasonable to assume that she would have 1 0 to 11 false positives 
over the period of time that she was taking those tests? 
A: It's difficult to have a false positive pulmonary function test, but not absolutely 
impossible. The measures that they take to ensure that it's an accurate study is by having 
the patient make maximal efforts. And by making it maximal, it should be reproducible. 
It should be the same every time. And they need to reproduce at least three that are the 
same before they accept it. 
And when you add the bronchoprovocation, then it adds a second layer of testing 
because they, again, have to reproduce it three times exactly the same. And that would be 
very difficult to do because her results were actually remarkably reproducible over that 
number of years. 
So I think that makes it les likely that it would have been an inaccurate study. 
Q: Okay. I just wanted to make sure that you understood there were five studies that were 
done at the University of Utah, but the other five or six were done elsewhere. And if they 
showed similar results, would that - what would you say about an expert who then says, 
"Well, they could have all been false positive"? 
A: It seems unlikely. I have access to the ones that were done at the University of Utah 
over that time and they were very reproducible." HC Depo., p. 23, line 1 - p. 24, line 10 
The evidence of these repeated Methacholine Challenge Tests is compelling, and was 
never challenged. 
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3. The Spirometry test conducted by Dr. Fullmer excludes a diagnosis of pre-
existing asthma, and confirms the RADS diagnosis. 
The Spirometry results actually excluded a diagnosis of pre-existing asthma independent 
ofRADS. When coupled with the compelling Methacholine Challenge Tests, the results confirm 
that Lesia Knowlton's chronic asthma symptoms are a component ofRADS. 
Both the Spirometry test and Methacholine Challenge Test start with a baseline 
spirometry. But in the spirometry test, a bronchodilator is introduced to open the bronchial tubes 
and measure the improvement in air capacity, while in the latter, methacholine, a chemical 
irritant, is introduced that induces bronchospasm. RADS is a medical condition in which the 
person has airway hyperreactivity to irritants. As Dr. Carveth described: "RADS is an irritant 
reaction in the airway that's different than asthma, that includes inflammation, airway 
hyperresponsiveness, that may be long term." HC Depo., p. 15, lines 6 - 9 
Here is how Dr. Fullmer differentiated between the two tests. 
" ... we had her come back for spirometry, pre and post-bronchodilator spirometry, which 
is a pulmonary function test that measures how much air she can blow and how fast she 
can blow it. And that's how we look for asthma or other kinds oflung disease, it's one of 
the tools. 
Q: Is this different than Methacholine Challenge Test? 
A: Yes, it is. Methacholine Challenge is a spirometry testing. But instead of using a -
with pre and post-bronchodilator spirometry, that's a basic routine everyday tool that 
pulmonologists, allergists, family practice, internal medicine doctors use spirometry in 
their offices to screen for lung disease or to monitor a person's asthma or something. And 
with pre and post bronchodilator spirometry, we do a baseline spirometry and measure 
how much a person can blow. And then we give them a bronchodilator medicine that 
opens up their bronchial tubes and we measure again, have them repeat the test. And if 
they have at least a 15 percent or more improvement in some of the numbers, then that's 
suggestive of asthma. And whereas a Methacholine Challenge test, the person has 
baseline spirometry, and if it's - there's some limitations where you don't want to do a 
Methacholine Challenge test. But, basically, you do a baseline spirometry, then you give 
them progressive challenges of methacholine, which is a -it's a drug that can induce 
bronchospasm even in normal people in high enough concentration. People with asthma 
are more sensitive and will have a 15 or 20 percent change in their numbers at a lower 
level of methacholine than a normal person will. And there's defined thresholds for 
what's considered abnormal as far as having reactive airways. So it's basically more of a 
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provocation test where you're inducing bronchospasm." (RF Depo., p. 23 , line 4 - p. 24, 
line 18.) 
If Lesia Knowlton had a lung disease or severe asthma that reduced her lung capacity at 
all times, when she took the first Spirometry test, the baseline results and the improvement with 
bronchodilation would have disclosed it. Instead, the results showed that her problem was not her 
baseline lung capacity, which was normal. RF Depo., p. 27, line19 - p. 28, line 24. The 
Methacholine Challenge Tests showed that Ms. Knowlton's problem was reduction in air flow 
with the introduction of irritants, which corresponds with a diagnosis of irritant-induced asthma, 
RADS. The Spirometry results corroborate the subsequent Methacholine Challenge Test 
findings. 
4. Lesia Knowlton's history, symptoms, examinations, diagnoses and tests satisfy 
all of the eight (8) diagnostic criteria for RADS. 
The defense presented a list of eight (8) diagnostic criteria for RADS, but did not make 
the claim that all of these criteria had to be present in order to make the diagnosis. Nonetheless, 
Ms. Knowlton's history, symptoms, medical records and tests satisfy all eight (8) criteria. 
Dr. Carveth, a medical expert in the diagnosis of RADS, testified that, "Typically not all 
of the criteria have to be met for a diagnosis." HC Depo., p. 112, line 23 - p. 113, line 3. 
Dr. Carveth diagnosed Ms. Knowlton's RADS condition not for purposes of this 
litigation, but as a clinician for the purpose of treating her.. In doing so, she used her extensive 
medical skills and training with that singular goal in mind. Dr. Carveth gave this personal 
definition ofRADS: 
"It's a clinical diagnosis versus a specific test that you can make that clinches it, which, 
of coUrse is part of the reason that we're here. It relates to a toxic irritant exposure, 
typically with immediate symptoms, that the person often can relate the specific date and 
time that it occurred. Should be followed soon after by symptoms that can relate to the 
airway, could be in the chest, could be in the throat. Symptoms tend to be chest tightness, 
cough, shortness of breath. And over time, the prominent symptoms can be a repeat of 
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those same cough, shortness of breath symptoms, either with exposure to non-specific 
irritants even in small amounts or triggers for asthma. And the other component is that 
the patient should not have had predisposing asthma .... A methacholine challenge test 
that's positive can be helpful." He Depo., p. 51, line 12 - p. 52, line 2. 
Criteria 1. 
The Defendant argued that Lesia Knowlton didn't meet the first diagnostic Criteria for 
RADS because she had "prior respiratory complaints." The only evidence of such a complaint 
was in November, 1988. As noted above, Dr. Fullmer noted only that she had "occasional mild 
dyspnea with running after her brother." She was not treated for any respiratory condition prior 
to the exposure on 9/12/00. 
Moreover, the defense expert, Dr. Munday, testified that this criteria has been 
abandoned. He testified that a person may have other preexisting conditions and still be 
diagnosed with RADS. Tr. p. 146, lines 8 - 25. 
Criteria 2. 
The Defendant conceded that Lesia Knowlton's description of the exposure and onset of 
symptoms met Criteria 2. 
Criteria 3. 
Criteria 3 required an irritant in high concentration. However, the defense expert, Dr. 
Munday, admitted that this criteria has now been broadened to include both "a high level 
exposure that was initially used for RADS or lower levels, more prolonged exposures." Tr. p. 
146, lines 15 - 19. 
The exposure level was satisfied because there was evidence that the fumes were present 
in high concentration. Dr. Carveth testified that the acid taste in Lesia's mouth, severe cough and 
burning in her throat, together with general illness, was proof that the fumes were present in 
sufficiently high concentration to cause her airway injuries. HC Depo., p. 57, line 5 - 8. Dr. 
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Fullmer testified that Lesia reported an acid taste in her throat and he said that the acid taste 
could be indicative of a sulfuric acid exposure, and that the symptoms of such exposure could be 
mostly airway symptoms or mostly eye irritation. RF Depo., p. 16, line 4 - p. 17, line 22. Dr. 
Fullmer's office note of October 13, 2000 indicates that Lesia Knowlton also complained of 
severe nasal burning. "She did have some initial burning in her nasal passages with the exposure 
but this has since resolved." Exh. 2, p. 9. Dr. Henry's medical records also note that Lesia had 
"itchy, watery eyes" and "nasal congestion." Exh. 10, p. 1 Nurse Joyce Fogg, a defense witness, 
testified there was a strong rotten egg smell by the nurse's station. Exh. 24, JF Depo, p. 11, Line 
17 -po 12, line 19. 
The MSDS Sheet for Biotron indicated that the toxic level of that chemical was a very 
small amount -- one milligram per cubic meter, which is less than a drop in a 250 gallon barrel. 
Tr. p. 195, lines 21 - 25. 
Lesia's father, Warren Gorringe, testified that when he saw Lesia at her home the day 
after the exposure she had "glassy eyes, watery eyes. She was wiping them." WG Depo., p. 15, 
line 25 - p. 16, line 1. 
Criteria 4. 
Criteria 4 requires the onset of symptoms within 24 hours after exposure and persisting 
more than three months. As Dr. Carveth testified, to make the clinical diagnosis, the physician 
looks for the immediate onset of airway symptoms, such as chest tightness, cough and shortness 
of breath. Lesia Knowlton had those symptoms from the day ofthe exposure. Defendant's 
expert, Dr. Munday testified that Lesia Knowlton met this Criteria: 
"So, she clearly met the time period and her description of the potential initial exposure, 
as well as the onset of symptoms, clearly occurred within 24 hours of exposure, there is 
no doubt about that whatsoever." Tr. p. 147, lines 14-18. 
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Criteria 5. 
Criteria 5 requires symptoms simulating asthma. The Defendant argues that Lesia 
Knowlton did not have all of the symptoms of asthma, but at the same time argues that she had 
pre-existing asthma. This is internally inconsistent. The evidence shows that Ms. Knowlton did 
not have any pre-existing asthma, but after her exposure, contracted all of the symptoms of 
irritant-induced asthma. 
Defense expert, Dr. Stephen Munday, testified that: 
"RADS, as I think I said earlier, is just a subset of asthma and so you get the same 
symptoms as someone with asthma gets, which is subjectively they can complain of 
shortness of breath, on examination they typically would be wheezing. They can cough. 
Absolutely ... RADS - the only difference between RADS and any other asthma is just the 
proposed mechanism of onset of the condition." Tr. p. 168, lines 4-14. 
Dr. Munday testified that her medical records did not show "wheezing" that would 
support the RADS diagnosis. Tr. p. 170, line 19 - 24. However, Lesia Knowlton's medical 
records show that she did have 'wheezing.' The Gooding County Hospital note of November 11, 
2000 states that she presented "to the ER complaining of increasing wheezing and cough for Y2 
hour." Ex. 16, p. 2 Lesia's husband, David Knowlton, described Lesia's physical condition 
when he saw her on the evening of September 12, 2000. He said: 
"She was white and pasty. Like sweaty. And when she'd breathe or try to talk, she 
couldn't talk, she was hoarse. And when I got over next to her, you could hear the 
breathing was wheezing. It was really labored. Like when Davy had that RSV virus. 
Very, very difficult for her to breathe." DK depo, p. 11, lines 13 - 19. 
She also reported dyspnea to Dr. Fullmer on her initial visit on October 13,2000. His 
office note states: "She currently describes dyspnea on exertion with walking only about 50 
feet." Exh. 2, p. 8. 
Criteria 6. 
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Criteria 6 is "possible airflow obstruction shown in pUlmonary function tests." (Def. 
Brief, p. 13) Dr. Fullmer's impression was that the spirometry test performed on November 11, 
2000 indicated "mild to moderate reduction in flow rates .... this might suggest some mild 
reversible obstruction/asthma." Exh. 2, p. 13. All eleven (11) Methacholine Challenge Tests and 
each subsequent spirometry test showed airflow obstruction. As Dr. Carveth pointed out, it is not 
unusual for a person suffering from RADS to have a normal pulmonary function test "at rest." 
The obstruction is apparent when an irritant is introduced. He Depo., p. 59, line 19 - p. 60, line 
7. She also testified that a normal baseline pulmonary function test (PFT) can indicate that the 
RADS problems are from the upper airway. She testified: 
" ... 1 think a lot of people aren't aware that vocal cord dysfunction can be a part of 
RADS. And they - they might be fooled if baseline PFTs are normal and yet someone is 
having shortness of breath at the time. Because it could be from their upper airway." HC 
Depo., p. 113, lines 10 - 14. 
Criteria 7. 
Criteria 7 is a positive Methacholine Challenge test. Lesia Knowlton had eleven (11) tests 
that have all shown abnormal results corroborating a diagnosis ofRADS. 
Criteria 8. 
Criteria 8 is that other pulmonary disease is ruled out. Dr. Fullmer testified that Lesia 
Knowlton had no prior history of pulmonary problems. 
"When you saw Mrs. Knowlton in October 2000, did she have any prior history of 
pulmonary problems? 
A: Well, not according to my note then. She stated she'd otherwise been in good health. 
And no other symptoms I can recall at that time, preexistent symptoms." RF Depo., p. 
53, lines 3-11. 
Dr. Munday testified that Lesia Knowlton had no prior diagnosis of asthma. 
''Now, do the records that - the medical records that you reviewed for Mrs. Knowlton 
show any - were there ever any indications in the record that she had any asthmatic 
condition or asthma prior to September 12, 2000? 
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A: Well, there has never been any records that I have seen anywhere that gave her a 
diagnosis of asthma, so I would agree with that statement." Tr. p. 166, lines 10- 16. 
Ms. Knowlton met all eight (8) diagnostic criteria for RADS. 
5. Dr. Fullmer concurred with Dr. Carveth's opinion that Ms. Knowlton could 
have a long term RADS diagnosis. 
Dr. Ronald Fullmer opined that Lesia Knowlton's symptoms were related to sulfuric acid 
inhalation exposure. He wrote: 
"Her initial diagnosis was an inhalation injury secondary to sulfuric acid exposure. The 
patient was thought to have some upper airway and nasopharyngeal irritation related to 
the inhalation exposure. This was manifest by some discomfort in her throat, a cough, 
some hoarseness, and burning sensation in her upper chest with deep breathing .... These 
symptoms were probably related to the sulfuric acid inhalation exposure." Ex. 2, p. 17. 
Although Dr. Fullmer said that the duration of the injury should be no more than four to 
six weeks, he clarified that answer in his deposition. Dr. Fullmer was talking about Lesia's acute 
injury. He felt that the "initial severe symptoms would progressively improve over four months." 
By that time, the patient would be left with residual symptoms and be chronic and stable. RF 
Deposition, p. 26, Ll. 3 - 10. 
Dr. Fullmer concurred with Dr. Carveth's statement that Ms. Knowlton could have a long 
term RADS diagnosis. He testified: 
"Q: What did the fact that her shortness of breath was improving show to you? 
A: Well, that would be consistent with Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome. I mean, 
usually with that, you expect the person to progressively improve. And, you know, 
hopefully in no longer than about four to six months, they should hopefully be back to 
their baseline. If they don't return to baseline and they still have wheezing and shortness 
of breath, then that suggest one of two things, either they have underlying asthma that 
was exacerbated by their inhalation exposure or that the inhalation exposure actually 
induced chronic asthma." RF Depo., p. 26, lines 15 - p. 27, line 3. 
He went on to testify: 
Q: If Dr. Carveth expressed the opinion that she felt that Lesia Knowlton's condition 
could persist for months or years, her RADS condition, would you agree or disagree with 
that? 
Claimant's Memorandum in Support of Motiou for Reconsideration 16 
A: Oh, I agree with that. That's what I was saying is that the majority of people who have 
inhalation injury are going to recover without permanent sequelae. But a small fraction of 
patients do go on to have persistent chronic obstructive airways disease or asthma 
problems." RF Depo., p. 51, lines 7 -17. 
Dr. Fullmer opined that Lesia Knowlton's hoarseness was indicative ofRADS. He said: 
"Q: My question is, up above, where you talk about her problems with her voice and she 
gets hoarse with exposure to smoke, perfume and strong odors, could that be indicative or 
a component ofRADS, the sensitivity to those odors? 
A: Yeah, I think it probably could be. People who are - well, anybody who's got reactive 
airways disease, whether its asthma or Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome, many 
of them are going to be sensitive to any kind of irritants, smoke, dust, perfume, strong 
odors, cleaning agents. I mean, that's just common symptoms with that." RF p. 53, line 
24 - p. 54, line 11. 
6. Defense expert, Dr. William Wallace, excluded all possibility that allergies 
caused Lesia Knowlton's RADS respiratory irritant-induced asthma symptoms. 
The defense hired Dr. William Wallace, an allergist, to conduct a battery of allergy tests 
on Mrs. Knowlton. Dr. Wallace determined that Lesia Knowlton had no allergies. WW Depo., p. 
17, line 23 - p. 18, line 10. Given the negative results of all of the allergy skin tests, Dr. Wallace 
did not order any further tests on Mrs. Knowlton because he felt they already had sufficient 
negative information and had answered the question as to whether allergies explained Mrs. 
Knowlton's symptoms. They did not. WW Depo., p. 20, line 23 - p. 21, line 8. 
Dr. Wallace reviewed the records of Dr. Holly Carveth in which she diagnosed Lesia 
Knowlton with RADS and the possibility of vocal cord dysfunction. He agreed that there was 
nothing in his fmdings or testing that would contradict her findings. He also agreed that the 
symptoms ofRADS can include coughing, wheezing and shortness of breath, and that ifLesia 
Knowlton had RADS, she would not need an allergy to anything in order to have those 
symptoms. WW Depo., p. 23, line 24 - p. 24, line 16. 
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Dr. Fullmer also testified that people can have "intrinsic asthma," which he defined as 
being more sensitive to chemicals and irritants in their environment, smoke, or cleaning agents, 
without having allergic asthma. Dr. Fullmer agreed that these symptoms are common in p~rsons 
who have contracted RADS. RF Depo., p. 40, line 7 - p. 41, line 8. Dr. Fullmer said: 
" ... where you talk about her problems with her voice and she gets hoarse with exposure 
to smoke, perfume and strong odors, could that be indicative ofRADS, the sensitivity to 
those odors? 
"A: Yeah, I think it probably could be. People who are - well, anybody who's got 
reactive airways disease, whether its asthma or Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome, 
many of them are going to be sensitive to any kind of irritants, smoke, dust, perfume, 
strong odors, cleaning agents. I mean, that's just common symptoms with that. 
Q: Do you see a lot of cases ofRADS? 
A: A fair number." RF Depo., p. 53, line 24 - p. 54, line 13. 
Defense expert, Dr. Munday, also testified that RADS is just a subset of asthma. The only 
difference is the mechanism of onset. Tr. p. 168, lines 4 - 14. 
m 
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT 
THE OPINIONS OF DEFENSE EXPERTS 
A. Dr. Stephen Munday's testimony had no scientific foundation in the medical 
evidence and was given undue weight by the referee. 
The Referee adopted the opinions of defense expert, Dr. Stephen Munday, who opined 
that the cause of Lesia Knowlton's RADS symptoms was pre-existing GERD and asthma. He 
offered this opinion in the absence of any prior diagnosis of either condition; in the absence of 
any pre-existing symptoms; in the face of immediate symptoms and objective test results that 
confirmed the diagnosis of RADS resulting from exposure to a toxic irritant; and contrary to the 
medical findings and opinions ofLesia Knowlton's treating physicians. 
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In Dr. Munday's opinion, Lesia Knowlton had GERD, that was entirely asymptomatic 
prior to the chemical exposure on September 12, 2000, which he claims accounts for all of her 
respiratory symptoms, even after it was entirely controlled in 2004. He testified: 
"Well, GERD is a very interesting disease, because people can have GERD and not know 
that they have it, because there may not be any obvious symptoms." Tr. p. 144, lines 14-
16. 
Dr. Munday admitted that Mrs. Knowlton had never been diagnosed with GERD prior to 
the chemical exposure. 
"And prior to this -the incident of September 12, 2000, were there any medical records 
that showed that Lesia Knowlton had GERD? 
A: I didn't see anything that said she had GERD." Tr. p. 166, lines 17 - 20. 
The first mention ofGERD in any of Lesia Knowlton's medical records is on January 9, 
2001 when she was seen at the University of Utah Hospital by Dr. Holly Carveth. Exh. 17, p. 1 
From September 12,2000 to that date, Lesia Knowlton was seen by Laira Thomas, nurse 
practitioner, Dr. Thomas Pryor, Dr. Ron Fullmer, the ER physicians at Gooding County 
Memorial Hospital, and Dr. Richard Henry. She did not report symptoms of GERD to any of 
these medical providers, nor is it reported in any of their medical records. 
We also know from the January, 2001 laryngoscopy results that there were no objective 
signs of GERD four months earlier on September 12, 2000, because there were no objective 
fmdings of scarring or lesions when the laryngoscopy was performed. Exh. 1 7, p. 15, 17. 
Lesia Knowlton did not have any symptoms of GERD, asthma, or any other pulmonary 
condition prior to her exposure to toxic chemicals on September 12,2000. Those facts are not in 
dispute. No treating physician has concluded that GERD can account for all of Lesia Knowlton's 
respiratory symptoms. In fact, Dr. Fullmer and Dr. Carveth both have testified that RADS does 
account for all of her symptoms, but GERD cannot account for Lesia Knowlton's respiratory 
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symptoms. No treating physician could have diagnosed Lesia Knowlton with GERD on 
September 12, 2000 because she had no symptoms or objective evidence of it. 
It is impossible to rebut the testimony of an expert who claims that the evidence that a 
medical condition exists is the absence of any physical evidence that it exists. But that is the 
burden of proof that the Referee imposed on the Claimant. Ms. Knowlton presented undisputed 
facts about the exposure, compelling medical testimony and records that substantiate the 
diagnosis ofRADS and its causation from this exposure, as well as the testimony of 16 other 
witnesses to her condition pre and post the exposure that corroborate Ms. Knowlton's testimony 
and the medical evidence. But the Referee required more. He required her to prove an impossible 
negative -- that she did not have completely asymptomatic GERD, a disease without any 
physical symptoms or signs, prior to her exposure on 9/12/00. 
All that the Claimant can do in light of this impossible evidentiary burden is note that 
there is no scientific basis for Dr. Munday's opinion. It does not meet the evidentiary standards 
for a medical expert opinion. It cannot be tested. It cannot be proven. It is therefore not scientific 
evidence and it should have been stricken. Rule 703 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence requires 
expert opinion testimony to be based on "facts or data" "of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in fonning opinions or inferences upon the subject ... " As the Court 
held in Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (Idaho 
2007): 
"Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the 
record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and, therefore, is 
inadmissible as evidence. Bromley, 132 Idaho at 811, 979 P.2d at 1169. The Court has 
not adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility of an expert's testimony but has used 
some of Daubert's standards in assessing whether the basis of an expert's opinion is 
scientifically valid. See Swallow v. Emergency Med. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589,595 n. 1, 
67 P.3d 68, 74 (2003) ("this Court has not adopted the Daubert test for admissibility"). 
The Daubert standards of whether the theory can be tested and whether it has been 
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subjected to peer-review and publication have been applied, but the Court has not 
adopted the standard that a theory must be commonly agreed upon or generally accepted. 
Compare Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 
2796-97, 125 L.Ed.2d 469,482-84 (1993) with Merwin, 131 Idaho at 646, 962 P.2d at 
1030. 
Thus "[t]he question under the evidence rule is simply whether the expert's 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact; not whether the information upon which the 
expert's opinion is based is commonly agreed upon." Merwin, 131 Idaho at 646, 962 P.2d 
at 1030. The Court stated that a scientific study does not have to be universally accepted 
in order for experts to validly use the study as a basis of opinion. ld. The focus of the 
court's inquiry is on the "principles and methodology" used not the conclusions they 
generate.ld (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. at 2797, 125 L.Ed.2dat484). 
When an "expert's opinion is based upon scientific knowledge, there must likewise be a 
scientific basis for that opinion" because if the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
opinion is not scientifically sound, then the opinions would not assist a trier of fact. 
Swallow, 138 Idaho at 592, 67 P.3d at 71. 
B. Defense expert, Dr. Craig Beaver, did not dispute the RADS diagnosis or 
attribute all of Lesia Knowlton's RADS symptoms to anxiety. 
1. Dr. Beaver's opinions were based on faIse factual assumptions. 
Dr. Beaver acknowledged in his deposition that Lesia Knowlton had no prior history of 
depression, no prior diagnosed mental health disorder, no neurocognitive difficulties and no drug 
or alcohol issues before the exposure on September 12,2000. CB Depo., p. 52, line 19 - p. 54, 
line 2. From the records he reviewed, Dr. Beaver did not see any indication that the stresses and 
anxieties in her life had ever caused Lesia Knowlton any kind of problems at home or at work. 
CB Depo., p. 55, lines 3 - 7. 
Nonetheless, the defense postulated that Lesia Knowlton's initial onset of symptoms on 
September 12, 2000 was due to psychological factors -- emotional difficulties she was having in 
a custody fight with her ex-husband over custody of her children. CB Depo., p. 12, lines 9-14. 
However, there was no evidence to support that claim. Lesia's breathing problems started on 
September 12, 2000. She did not discover the physical abuse of her children and become 
involved in a custody fight with her ex-husband until two years later. Bobbie Hobbs, who also 
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had a child with Lesia's ex-husband, testified that it was in 2002 that they both discovered the 
abuse of Lesia's girls and Bobbie's son. That was when they jointly initiated court proceedings 
for custody. Exh. 49, BH Depo., p. 9 - 10. 
The other emotional events referred to by Dr. Beaver, the death of Lesia's sister in April, 
2001, her father's heart attack that same year, and the death of her brother in 2006 also cannot 
account for her shortness of breath or coughing spells commencing eight months earlier in 
September, 2000. 
2. Dr. Beaver agreed that RADS could be the cause of Lesia Knowlton's breathing 
problems. 
Contrary to the Referee's finding, Dr. Beaver acknowledged that "some of the time or a 
lot of the time," Lesia Knowlton's breathing problems could be triggered by reactive airway 
disease rather than anxiety. He could not apportion those events as to causation, and only 
testified that "some episodes are triggered by emotions" because that is how RADS works. He 
testified: 
"Q: Did she tell you what she felt was the onset or the trigger that she understood caused 
or started the breathing episodes? 
A: Well, from her perspective, she always felt that the breathing problem came on first 
then she got nervous and anxious about it. 
Q: Okay. 
A: And I'm not saying that couldn't be true some of the time or a lot of the time, but she 
really would not acknowledge that it ever was the other way around. 
Q: Okay 
A: And she could have the most clearly verified physiological reactive airway disease 
problem where nobody would disagree that she had that severely, but some of the 
episodes that she's going to have are triggered by her emotions. That's just the way that 
disorder works. She had a hard time acknowledging that could be the case." CB Depo., p. 
50, line 17 - p. 51, line 11. 
Dr. Carveth's opinion was that being unable to breathe produces anxiety and that anxiety 
worsens airway tightness and difficulty with breathing. When asked whether she observed 
anxiety in Lesia around the time of the death of Lesia's sister in 2001, Dr. Carveth said: "I think 
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you're looking for sort of free floating anxiety. I saw anxiety related to her cough symptoms, her 
throat symptoms." HC Depo., p. 110, lines 9 - 24. 
Dr. Beaver admitted that it would not be abnonnal for Ms. Knowlton's inability to 
breathe to cause her to have anxiety about suffocation. 
Q: If, in fact, you have a case where a person has a breathing episode as she described, 
for whatever the cause, would it be abnonnal for that person to become anxious and to be 
panicked over their inability to breath and feeling like they were suffocating? 
A: No. 
Q: SO, the fact that she was having that response, whatever the original cause, wouldn't 
put her in an abnonnal category, would it, psychologically? 
A: No." CB Depo., p. 50, line 9 - p. 52, line 2 
Lesia' husband, David Knowlton, best described what he observed on a regular basis as 
the genesis of Lesia' s breathing episodes. 
"Before she went to Dr. Carveth, if she was exposed to something, it was, you know, it 
was a lot of anxiety along with the fact she couldn' t breathe. And she would just almost 
pass out. And she' d completely lose her voice for a half a day to a day, minimum. And 
Dr. Carveth, she was the one that showed her how to relax and so she could take her 
medication and how to work her voice so she would not lose it, but a couple of hours 
later, she'd get it back. And I don't know how long it takes her to get it back now. But 
before that, it was like a drowning victim . .. every time she'd get exposed to anything that 
would irritate her throat and her voice, everything would start shutting down. You know, 
it would start like restricting. And she couldn't get enough air. And it was panic, just like 
a drowning victim would be. She'djust start shaking, turn white, scared to death. And 
she just - it was like she was going to pass out ... . She really thought she was dying. One 
of these times, she wasn't going to come through." DK depo., p. 18, lines 3 - 14; p. 19, 
lines 6 - 13; p. 50, lines 5-6. 
The claimant has always acknowledged that there is a component of anxiety in her 
breathing problems. But that anxiety is the result of her disability, not its cause. As Dr. Holly 
Carveth testified: 
"Vocal cord dysfunction and anxiety often are interlinked. 
Q: Okay: And would you hold yourself out as qualified to diagnose and consult regarding 
anxiety or other maybe psychological or psychiatric issues? 
A: I think I'm qualified related to the interaction between vocal cord dysfunction, asthma 
and anxiety. 
Q: As far as it's physical manifestations, I would assume? 
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A: Yes. As well as having these disorders feed back and can worsen anxiety. Patients 
who are short of breath become anxious." HC Depo., p. 68, line 19 - p. 69, line 6. 
After spending two days interviewing Lesia Knowlton, Dr. Beaver concluded that she 
was open, honest and sincere about her physical condition. He noted: 
"Do you think in evaluating her over the two days that you saw her that she was open and 
honest and sincere about what she was telling you, that she sincerely believed what she 
was telling you about her physical condition? 
A: Yes, I think she believed it, as best I could tell." CB Depo., p. 58, lines 4 - 10. 
IV 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
The referee made a number of factual findings that are at odds with the record. 
Finding #4."In a 2003 deposition, Claimant first recalled that she worked from just after 
8:00 a.m. until 11 :30 p.m. She described in detail taking a meal break about 7 :00 p.m. 
and noticing that her lungs burned as she took deep breaths in the cold outdoor air. By the 
date of hearing, after reviewing documents, she recalled that she worked only until about 
4:00 p.m." 
Ms. Knowlton's testimony at the hearing on June 20, 2008, eight years after the day in 
question, was that she didn't recall, not that she "only" worked until 4:00 p.m. Moreover, she 
testified she was on a 12-hour shift that started a little after eight that morning, and therefore 
would have ended no earlier than 8:00 p.m. Tr. p. 28, lines 2-5. 
"Q: Okay. And so how long were you at your post while the smell was continuing and the 
fans were pushing it towards you? 
A: I honestly don't remember today what time I left work that day. I do know that in my 
injury report it said I was there until 16:00 hours, which would have been 4:00 p.m. I also 
have a copy of my schedule for that day and it said I was on a 12 hour shift. So, at the 
very least until 4:00, 4:30 that afternoon." Tr. p. 35, lines 20-25. 
Lesia Knowlton testified at the hearing that she was exposed to fumes for about eight 
hours. That is consistent with the Report of Injury, Exh. 1, as well as her statements to treating 
physicians, Laira Thomas, FNP, Ex. 5, p. 8; Dr. Fullmer, Ex. 2, p. 8; Dr. Carveth, Ex. 17, p. 1. 
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Finding #13."On October 25,2000, Nurse Thomas prescribed Wellbutrin at Claimant's 
request to help her stop smoking." 
Laira Thomas's note referenced in this finding is as follows: "Has continued to quit 
smoking since her chemical exposure back in September. Is wanting to try some Wellbutrin." 
Ex. 5, p. 14. She quit smoking following the exposure as noted in Dr. Thomas Pryor's office note 
on September 25,2000. Exh. 9, p. 1 "She is a reformed smoker, but has quit since the incident." 
Although there is no evidence in the record that Ms. Knowlton ever smoked after the 
incident, the Referee makes this finding: 
Finding #18."In the weeks and months after the exposure ... Incongruously, she 
occasionally smoked cigarettes while driving but reported no breathing or other problems 
when doing so." 
Finding #22."Claimant inconsistently reported her smoking habits after the exposure." 
If these findings were true, they are so important that it is inconceivable that they would 
not appear in the Defendant's Post Hearing Brief. But they do not. The reason is that Ms. 
Knowlton only testified that at the time of the incident she was still smoking minimally. She 
never testified that she continued to smoke after the exposure, and her medical records reflect 
that she quit smoking when it occurred. In her 2004 deposition, she testified (LK Depo., p. 204, 
lines 6-13): 
"Q: Okay. At that time you were smoking? 
A: Some, yes. 
Q: Did you take a cigarette break? 
A: Nope. I never smoked at work. I only smoked when I drove. It took me a week and a 
half to go through a pack of cigarettes. It was just a driving vice, and only if I didn't have 
any kids in the car with me." 
Finding #24."In deposition, treating physician Ronald Fullmer, M.D. opined Claimant's 
symptoms were inconsistent with exposure to inhaled sulfuric acid. He considered GERD 
to be the more likely cause. He considered differential diagnoses of mild asthma and 
anxiety to be more likely than reactive airways dysfunction syndrome. He opined that the 
onset of increasing symptoms in the weeks after the exposure was more likely evidence 
of a psychological component. He held to his opinions expressed in his medical records 
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in 2000. Dr. Fullmer explained his reasons underlying his opinions. Given the Claimant 
the benefit of any possible doubt, he opined Claimant became medically stable form any 
possible inhalation injury within six weeks of the exposure." 
The Referee's rmding was that Dr. Fullmer concluded that Lesia Knowlton did not 
have RADS as diagnosed by Dr. Carveth. That is not accurate. Dr. Fullmer concurred with 
Dr. Carveth's diagnosis ofRADS. He testified: 
"A. Well, she did see an occupational pulmonary medicine at the University of Utah also, 
Dr. Carveth, and had a pretty extensive exam there . And she, basically, it sounds like, 
carne to the same conclusions, that she had Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome. 
And then also, you know, paradoxical vocal cord motion, which can pretty much mimic 
signs and symptoms of asthma. It's - and so that's the only other, as far as an expert 
opinion from a person specifically related to occupational exposures, that I'm already 
aware of." RF Depo., p. 47, lines 14 - 24. 
He went on to say: " ... most of what I read in Dr. Carveth's notes pretty much agreed 
with most of the things I thought was going on with the lady." RF Depo., p. 50, lines 17-20. 
Dr. Fullmer said that the duration of the injury should be no more than four to six weeks; 
however, he clarified that answer in his deposition. Dr. Fullmer was talking about Lesia's acute 
injury. He felt that the "initial severe symptoms would progressively improve over four 
months." By that time, the patient would be left with residual symptoms and be chronic and 
stable. RF Deposition, p. 26, lines 3 - 10. He also admitted that he couldn' t determine if Ms. 
Knowlton had any permanent impairment or restrictions because he didn't see her after 
December, 2000. RF Depo., p. 46, lines 13 - 14. He said: "Well, without any follow-up on the 
patient, it's kind of hard to do that." 
As noted in Subsection II.A.(5) above, and contrary to the Referee' s finding, Dr. Fullmer 
reported: "Her initial diagnosis was an inhalation injury secondary to sulfuric acid exposure." 
Ex. 2, p. 17. Contrary to the fmding, Dr. Fullmer testified that odor intolerances and persistent 
asthma problems could be related to the sulfuric acid injury and could not be caused by GERD. 
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RF Depo., p. 44, line 25 - p. 45, line 14. He also testified that her bronchodilator test results were 
not indicative of the effect of smoking or any neuromuscular disorder. He testified: "That is more 
suggestive of reactive airways disease like asthma or Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome 
or something like that." RF Depo., p. 33, lines 4-11. 
Finding #26. "She opined Claimant's vocal cord dysfunction was related to anxiety and 
acid reflux." 
This fmding is inaccurate. Dr. Carveth's January 9,2001 Assessment related Ms. 
Knowlton's vocal cord dysfunction to the toxic inhalation. She noted only that there was a 
component of severe anxiety that induced spasm and worsened dyspnea. "Her second problem 
appears to be paradoxical vocal cord motion or laryngospasm. This also appears related to the 
toxic inhalation. Now, there is a component of severe anxiety which induces the vocal cord 
spasm and worsens her dyspnea. This problem has been described in the past related to sulfuric 
acid exposure." Ex. 17, p. 3. 
In her deposition, Dr. Carveth testified that acid reflux can produce or aggravate vocal 
cord dysfunction. But in Ms. Knowlton's case, examination did not show any permanent scarring 
of the vocal cords that would have resulted from severe acid reflux. Dr. Carveth opined that Ms. 
Knowlton had a functional impairment consistent with RADS. HC Depo., p. 72, line 24 - p. 73, 
line 6; p. 74, line 4 - p. 77, line 2. 
On March 20,2001, Dr. Carveth notes reflect that even after Ms. Knowlton's acid reflux 
was controlled, she continued to suffer from laryngospasm, which Dr. Carveth testified was a 
known component ofRADS. Ex. 17, p. 19; HC Depo., p. 10, lines 10-13. 
Finding #27. "William W. Wallace, M.D., specializes in allergy immunology .. He opined 
she exhibited no allergic reaction to any of the potential allergens for which he tested: 
pollens, dander, etc. He opined she had no allergies related to possible sulfuric acid 
exposure." 
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This finding is an accurate statement but incomplete and misleading. Dr. Wallace found 
that Lesia Knowlton did not have any allergies. He also testified that she did not need to have 
any allergies in order to have RADS or its asthma-like symptoms, and his findings did not 
contradict Dr. Carveth' s RADS diagnosis. 
"If Ms. Knowlton was diagnosed with RADS and the possibility of vocal cord 
dysfunction, is there anything in your findings or testing that would contradict that 
diagnosis? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Okay. And the symptoms ofRADS, to your knowledge, they can include coughing 
and wheezing and shortness of breath." 
A: Absolutely. 
Q: And would you have to have an allergy to something in order to have those symptoms 
if you had RADS? 
A: You do not." WW Depo., p. 24, lines 4-16. 
Finding #28. " ... Claimant's history does not meet the criteria for a diagnosis ofRADS." 
As noted in Subsection II.A.( 4). above, Ms. Knowlton met all eight (8) criteria for a 
diagnosis of RADS. 
Parenthetically, in this finding, Dr. Munday is reported as having opined that the 
Claimant did not suffer from asthma. If the Referee adopted that finding, it is inconsistent with 
the conclusion that pre-existing asthma caused or contributed to causing Ms. Knowlton's RADS 
symptoms. 
Finding #29. "Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D .... opined inhalation exposure was not the 
predominate cause of Claimant's symptoms initially and was not a probable cause of her 
later-appearing symptoms. He attributed her later-appearing symptoms as probably 
psychologically, not physically, caused. He opined that asthma was known to be related 
to somatization and that Claimant developed a "conditioned relationship" of exhibiting 
symptoms as a result of emotional distress, anxiety, and depression, all of which stemmed 
from a naIve personality." 
As rioted in Subsection III.B.(1) above, Dr. Beaver's conclusions as to causation are 
highly suspect because he based them on false assumptions. He opined that Ms. Knowlton's 
initial symptoms were the result of her anxiety over a custody dispute that he assumed was 
Claimant'll Memorandum iu Support of Motion for Reconsideration 28 
ongoing in September, 2000, when in fact, it didn' t occur until two years after the symptoms 
arose. 
As noted in Subsection III.B.(2) above, Dr. Beaver did not opine that Ms. Knowlton's 
symptoms's were primarily the result of anxiety and depression. Contrary to the Referee's 
fmding, Dr. Beaver acknowledged that "some of the time or a lot of the time," Lesia Knowlton's 
breathing problems could be triggered by reactive airway disease rather than anxiety. He could 
not apportion those events as to causation, and only testified that "some episodes are triggered by 
emotions" because that is how RADS works. 
Findings #30 - 33. "Credibility - Claimant." 
The Referee refers to inconsistencies in Ms. Knowlton's testimony, but does not point out 
any specific facts to which we can respond. In referring to other witnesses, Finding #35 states 
that testimony from the 16 other witnesses about Claimant's breathing, vocal or other symptoms 
was deemed credible. However, it does not appear that much if any weight was given to the 
testimony of all of these witnesses, who corroborated the Claimant's own story of the exposure, 
her resulting symptoms, and its physical effects on her for the past eight years. 
Finding #36. "Causation ... The exposure itself is problematic ... No other co-workers 
were reportedly harmed in any way" 
The evidence presented on the issue of Claimant's exposure was undisputed. Ms. 
Knowlton was the only person next to a fan blowing the fumes at her nurse's station all day. 
Finding #37. "Among the clinical criteria required for a RADS diagnosis are the 
"documented absence of preceding respiratory complaints ... very high concentrations [of 
chemical irritant, and] ... onset of symptoms occurred within 24 hours after the exposure 
and persisted for at least three months." Each of these factors is equivocal or absent from 
the medical records of treating physicians." 
As noted in Subsection II.A.(4) above, Ms. Knowlton met all eight (8) criteria for a 
diagnosis of RADS. 
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Finding #38. "Dr. Munday's thorough report and testimony was persuasive. No external 
chemical, whether sulfuric acid or another irritant, could likely have caused Claimant's 
lung and throat symptoms without first significantly burning her eyes and nose .... he 
explained how GERD was more consistent than chemical inhalation. Dr. Munday also 
explained why GERD was the likely cause of Claimant's cough and burning sensation in 
her lungs and throat." 
Finding #39. "The opinions of treating physician Dr. Fullmer and expert toxicologist Dr. 
Munday are consistent with each other. Together, they establish that Claimant's exposure 
on September 12, 2000 did not cause any symptoms or condition which would have 
reasonably required medical care." 
The weight given by the Referee to Dr. Munday' s testimony is unwarranted because it 
was not based on scientific or medical evidence, but pure speculation that the Claimant had a 
completely asymptomatic condition of GERD. She developed the cough and burning sensation in 
her lungs and throat immediately following the exposure on 9/12/00, but had no symptoms of 
GERD until at least four (4) months later, and even six (6) months after the exposure, had no 
signs of scarring of the vocal cords indicative of severe GERD. 
Nor are the opinions of Dr. Munday and Dr. Fullmer consistent. As noted above in 
Subsection II.A.(5) Dr. Fullmer concurred with Dr. Carveth's RADS diagnosis. In addition, he 
opined that Ms. Knowlton could have suffered sulfuric acid inhalation injury without significant 
burning of her eyes or nose. 
"I suppose one person could have mostly airway symptoms and another could have 
mostly eye irritation or both. But I'm not sure it's exclusive that a person is going to have 
both." RF Depo., p. 17, line 16-20. 
He also noted: 
"Well, a month after exposure, even if she did have chemical burns or injuries to her 
nasal pharynx, oropharynx, that would probably have mostly healed and resolved by that 
time .. Whether she had significant mucosal injury early on, I don't know, because I didn't 
examine her at that time." RF Depo., p. 20, line 13-20. 
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Dr. Carveth also testified she had seen cases of significant lower respiratory 
inflammation from irritant exposure without major eye or upper respiratory symptoms. HC 
Depo., p. 64, lines 7-24. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law are not based on substantial competent 
evidence and do not support the order. The Claimant met her burden of proof in this case and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order should be reversed. 
Dated: November 19,2009. 
&-:2) V 
Christ T. TroupiT 
Attorney for Claimant 
Leisa Knowlton 
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DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1 
COME NOW, the Defendants, Wood River Medical Center, and the Idaho 
Insurance Guaranty Association, successor in interest to Fremont Compensation 
Insurance Group, by and through the undersigned Counsel of record, and hereby 
submit Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case came on for hearing before the Industrial Commission on June 20, 
2008. On October 16, 2009, the presiding Referee Issued Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. By way of an Order dated November 3,2009, the Commission 
approved, confirmed, and adopted the Referee's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, determining pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, the decision was final and 
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated. 
On November 19, 2009, Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the 
grounds that the Commission made several errors of fact involving causation, 
Claimant's subsequent symptoms and expert opinions. Claimant fails to identify any 
errors of law. The matter is now before the Commission for determination. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission is not required to construe facts liberally in favor of 
the worker when evidence is conflicting. Aldrich v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho 
361, 363, 834 P.2d 878 (1992)(citing Bennett v. Bunker Hill Co., 88 Idaho 300, 305, 
399 P.2d 270 (1965}). The purpose of a reconsideration is to provide a more 
definitive format for valuable legal critique. The Industrial Commission will not re-
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weigh evidence and arguments simply because the case was not resolved in the 
claimant's favor. The intent is to provide a more definitive format for valuable legal 
critique but discourage reactionary and insubstantial motions when a disgruntled party 
merely wants the Commission to "think it over again." The Industrial Commission's 
finding and decision must be upheld if supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Revas v. K.C. Logging, 134 Idaho 603, 607, 7 P.3d 212 (2000). 
Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion. Reaves v. K. C. Logging, 134 Idaho at 607. The 
Commission is the fact finder, and its conclusions on the credibility and weight of 
evidence will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Reaves, 134 Idaho at 
607. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
Claimant's November 19, 2009, Motion for Reconsideration, essentially 
requests that the Industrial Commission re-weigh and re-interpret evidence or "think it 
over again" simply because the case was not resolved in Claimant's favor. 
Interestingly, the arguments presented in Claimant's Memorandum are nearly identical 
to those expressed in her excessive Reply Brief prior to the decision. As the 
Commission knows, Defendants objected to Claimant's Reply Brief and asked that it be 
stricken from the record due to Claimant's failure to conform with the briefing page 
limits under J.R.P. Rule 11 (A). The Commission chose to forego ruling on the Motion 
to Strike in light of the ultimate findings on the case. 
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I. The Industrial Commission's Decision is Supported by Substantial and 
Competent Evidence. 
It is the province of the Industrial Commission is to determine the weight and 
credibility of testimony and to resolve conflicting interpretations of testimony. Spencer 
v. AI/press Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000). Essentially, at its core, 
Claimant's argument is that the presiding Referee should ignore the plain and 
established facts as well as the "law of the case" and extrapolate, presume, abstract, 
and speculate while engrafting secondary medical opinions to reach a conclusion that 
Claimant's testimony was credible and that her experts' opinions outweigh those of 
world renown specialists. This proposed approach is, in and of itself, unreasonable 
and clearly transgresses the main goal of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law. 
Claimant's purported grounds for the instant Motion for Reconsideration are 
nothing more than a request for the Commission to re-weigh the evidence and "think it 
over again" because the case was not resolved in Claimant's favor. The presiding 
Referee and ultimately the Commission acted in accord with the factual and legal 
dictates of worker's compensation law and found accordingly. In effect, Claimant 
requests that the Commission ignore the "law of the case" doctrine and extrapolate 
unsupported inferences from the record. Conversely, Defendants believe the presiding 
Referee made a well-reasoned decision based upon the weight of the evidence 
specifically presented by Claimant and issued a decision accordingly. As such, the 
presiding Referee's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations were 
well-substantiated in both law and fact and therefore not clearly erroneous. Therefore, 
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the October 16, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation as 
well as the November 3, 2009, affirming Order are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence and should not be set aside upon reconsideration. 
A. The Evidence Established that Claimant's Symptoms Were Not 
Related to an Alleged Inhalation Exposure 
Claimant's initial argument on reconsideration is a claim that the evidence 
showed that her alleged symptoms were caused by the potential chemical exposure on 
September 12, 2000, and she continues to dispute the GERDs diagnosis and its 
relationship to her actual symptoms. Notwithstanding the fact that Claimant does not 
offer any new evidence or testimony other than what was submitted during and after 
the hearing, she continues to ignore the fact that one of main reasons she failed in her 
assertions was her own lack of credibility. Claimant does not raise any new issues of 
law that mandate that her interpretation of the facts should prevail over the Industrial 
Commission's Decision. 
Claimant suggests that there was no evidence of pre-existing asthma or GERDs 
to account for her symptoms after the alleged exposure on September 12, 2000. She 
points to the record, which is somewhat sparse with respect to her medical history 
prior to the incident in question. Focusing on that, she contends that no medical 
records detailing pre-existing conditions means there could not have been a pre-
existing problem. This, of course, ignores the fact that subsequent testing showed 
that Claimant's GERDs condition, even though diagnosed after the fact, had advanced 
to a stage that it had to pre-exist her alleged exposure. 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 5 
Obviously, her problems had not risen to a level to cause her to seek medical 
care. Unfortunately, her symptoms worsened at the same time she allegedly was 
exposed at the workplace. It was this incident that brought her condition to the 
forefront. As mentioned previously, Dr. Munday's testified that minor cases of GERDs 
may not always be obvious to the patient until they become severe. He noted that 
GERDs is often discovered when the offending stomach acid makes its way into the 
respiratory tract, causing "asthma like symptoms. II (Hearing Tr., pp. 144-145). Dr. 
Munday clarified that the exact nature of Claimant's symptoms (throat irritation, 
cough, metal taste in her mouth) more closely resemble issues with GERDs as opposed 
to an exposure to an airborne irritant. Id. 
Claimant cannot and does not explain why she had a lack of any upper 
respiratory or other mucous membrane irritation (nose or eyes) that would have been 
indicative of an exposure. Later on in her argument, she attempts to point to 
testimony from her husband that she was having problems with her eyes. However, 
this testimony came after the testimony of many of the experts involved and seemed 
to be a stop gap effort to circumvent the fact that the record was devoid of any of 
these type of symptoms prior to incident. 
Claimant refers to a number of notations and statements made by Drs. Carveth 
and Fullmer in their notes and post-hearing depositions as proof that she did not have 
any pre-existing issues with asthma or GERDSS. Unfortunately, both of these doctors' 
testimony were tempered by the fact that they were relying on extremely subjective 
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and selective information provided to them solely from Claimant. Both of these 
doctors were told by Claimant that she had been exposed to sulfuric acid. They had 
no other independent information, other than what Claimant was telling them, as to 
what had happened on September 12, 2000. Again, the trier of fact is placed in a 
position where they need to make a judgment call as to a witness's credibility. Sorry 
to say, Claimant's credibility or lack thereof was her own worse enemy and raised 
many questions about what really happened on September 12, 2000. 
This is further borne out by the fact that it was questionable whether Claimant 
was exposed to harmful levels of any chemical at all. Claimant's memorandum next 
references a claim that the evidence undisputedly showed that a toxic exposure 
occurred. Claimant suggests that co-worker testimony couple with the "immediate" 
onset of her symptoms established that she was exposed to sulfuric acid. She totally 
discounts the fact that the testimony only showed that other co-worker's noticed a 
strange smell. This hardly proves she was exposed to dangerous levels of a particular 
chemical. 
Instead, the Referee and the Industrial Commission chose to rely upon the 
expert testimony of a specialist trained in recognizing and treating toxic exposures. 
Again, the issue of Claimant's specific symptoms following the alleged exposure work 
to her detriment. It was addressed ad nauseam at hearing and in the post-hearing 
depositions that it was impossible to suffer a significant exposure to airborne sulfuric 
acid without having serious irritation of the face and eyes. Claimant's coughing fits, 
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raspy voice and subsequent skin and odor intolerances simply did not correspond to 
the type of exposure she was alleging. Claimant has presented no new facts to 
counter this issue. 
The substantial and competent evidence before the Commission established that 
Claimant was not exposed to significant levels of any toxic chemical to produce the 
symptoms she alleges. Claimant's own actions after the alleged exposure coupled 
with her transient, subjective and across the board symptoms only served to eat away 
at her own credibility. There is no legal or factual basis for the Industrial Commission 
to overturn its decision in this respect. 
B. Claimant's RADS Diagnosis is Suspect and Unrelated to her 
Alleged Inhalation Exposure 
Claimant's second argument asserts that the evidence shows she "contracted 
RADS" as a result of an inhalation injury. Interestingly, Claimant's argument in her 
brief for reconsideration is an almost exact reproduction of the arguments expressed in 
her Reply Brief filed during the post-hearing period. Defendants already objected to 
most, if not all, of the content of this brief due to the fact that it was submitted in 
violation of the briefing requirements set forth under the Judicial Rules of Procedure. 
Nevertheless, the arguments espoused by Claimant ask the Commission to focus on 
the methacholine challenge testing and spirometry done over the course of her 
treatment to justify her RADS diagnosis. Claimant again makes an argument with 
respect to causation, suggesting the alleged exposure led to her development of RADS. 
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Defendants have already addressed the subjectivity of the testing involved in 
Claimant's treatment. Test results can be skewed by lack luster effort on the part of 
the participant. Additionally, the testing along cannot stand by itself to justify a RADS 
diagnosis. Again, GERDs became a more reasonable diagnosis when the totality of 
Claimant's symptoms are considered. Normal pulmonary spirometry testing results 
occurring at the same time as mild to moderately reactive methacholine challenge tests 
are not indicative of a person truly suffering from a sulfuric acid exposure. Instead, 
that individual would be expected to have significantly positive spirometry testing. 
Obviously, having only severe GERDs like symptoms with no lung damage is not 
consistent with RADS. (Hearing Tr., pp. 168-169). 
The significance of Dr. Fullmer's and Dr. Carveth's diagnosis of RADS should be 
tempered against the fact that they were receiving purely subjective information from 
Claimant regarding the exposure and the development of her symptoms afterwards. 
Both doctors acknowledge the imperfect nature of methacholine challenge testing and 
their own loose application of the RADS diagnosis criteria. Obviously, focusing on the 
criteria was not their primary concern. Instead, they were attempting to treat an 
individual that claimed she was suffering from ever worsening symptoms that failed to 
resolve after an extended period of time. Dr. Fullmer clearly could see that there was 
not much more he could do for Claimant after a few months, after which he basically 
washed his hands of her care. 
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Claimant's own belief that she had suffered an exposure led her to shop around 
until she found another source of treatment, which led her to Dr. Carveth. Dr. Henry is 
an anomaly. He was not a specialist in toxic exposure and his involvement in 
Claimant's treatment was so minimal, that it hardly could be seen as significant 
enough to carry much weight . Dr. Carveth made clear during her deposition that she 
had to rely entirely upon Claimant's own version of what had happened and the 
doctor's role was limited to medical treatment, as opposed to investigation and 
diagnosis. All involved noted they would defer to a specialist in toxic exposure . 
Claimant next tries to imply that because Defendants' expert Dr. Wallace 
concluded that Claimant was not suffering from any allergic reactions as a result of an 
alleged exposure, then RADS was the only possible explanation for her ongoing 
symptoms. Dr. Wallace was consulted solely to conduct allergy testing, to attempt to 
stretch his diagnosis (or lack thereof for allegeries) to show support for Claimant's 
RADS claims is incredulous. The primary lesson we learned from Dr. Wallace is that 
Claimant is not credible. He totally disputed all of Claimant's assertions that she was 
suffering from numerous allergies as the result of an alleged exposure. Instead, he 
showed that she was not reactive to any substance that tested for. 
C. The Evidence Supported the Opinions of the Defense Experts 
Claimant next attacks the opinions and foundation for such of Defendants' 
experts, Dr. Munday and Dr. Beaver. It is interesting that Claimant waited until her 
Motion for Reconsideration to raise these arguments, instead of at the time of hearing 
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or their post-hearing depositions. Claimant suggests that Dr. Munday had no scientific 
foundation for his opinion that pre-existing conditions or other issues could account for 
her symptoms. She also asserts that Dr. Beaver's opinions were based upon false 
factual assumptions and could have been attributable to her RADS diagnosis. Totally 
ignoring the fact that Claimant is again asking the Commission to rehash the same 
evidence, Defendants suggest to the contrary. Doctors Munday and Beaver had more 
information and facts available to them than any of Claimant's "experts" and they 
were able to develop their opinions based upon the entire medical and psychological 
history of Claimant, unlike Claimant' s experts who were limited to extremely subjective 
information. 
Turning first to the foundational arguments raised by Claimant, Defendants 
contend that Claimant failed to raise her objections to the testimony of Drs. Munday 
and Beaver in a timely manner, and as a result, thereby waived their right to raise 
these new objections at this early date. It is a long standing tenet of Idaho case law 
that a failure to object to evidence when introduced is a waiver of objection that it is 
inadmissible. Naccarato v. Priest River, 68 Idaho 368, 373 (1948). Evidence 
introduced without objection stands as evidence in the case for all purposes. Angelus 
Securities Corp. v. Chester, 128 Cal.App. 437, 17 P.2d 1016; Hamlin v. University of 
Idaho, 61 Idaho 570, 574, 104 P.2d 625. And the same is sufficient to support a 
finding. Powers v. Board of Public Works, 216 Cal. 546,15 P.2d 156. To now raise 
the argument that the testimony and opinions of these experts is dubious. Claimant 
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had both of these experts' opinions long before the hearing and could have objected to 
their foundation prior to the presentation of their testimony. To raise this issue at this 
late date warrants the denial of Claimant's request. 
Turning to the opinions themselves, Claimant argues that the conclusion made 
by Dr. Munday that Claimant was suffering from pre-existing GERDs has no scientific 
basis. She asserts that since there are no records showing GERDs like symptoms 
before the accident, it is impossible for her to be suffering from it before its later 
diagnosis. As with her prior arguments, Claimant ignores the fact that her symptoms 
more closely resemble the condition of GERDs instead of the RADS diagnosis that she 
pushes. She asks the Commission to rely upon the untrained opinions of a number of 
Claimant's acquaintances who testified about her physical condition prior to the 
alleged exposure. Claimant suggests that she is faced with an insurmountable task of 
proving a negative. Unfortunately, she had every opportunity to prove her case and 
her evidence was not convincing. 
As a threshold proposition, any opinion testimony offered by either a lay or an 
expert witness must be based upon competent, factual evidence. If a sufficient 
factual foundation is established, the opinion can be considered. Theonnes v. Hazen, 
37 Wash. App. 644, 681 P.2d 1284 (1984), cited with approval, Ryan v. Beisner, 
123 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct. App. 1992). Dr. Munday's background, 
combined with his overall review of the medical records and depositions taken of 
numerous individuals, concluded that the facts showed Claimant was suffering from 
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GERDs at the time of her exposure. Without the upper respiratory or other nasal or 
eye symptoms, there was no way to conclude there was an exposure leading to 
RADS. Dr. Munday possessed the necessary "specialized knowledge" required to 
substantiate the opinions identified in his report and testimony. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals has made clear that expert testimony is clearly admissible when the expert's 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence and to 
determine a fact in question. State v. Dragoman, 130 Idaho 537, 944 P.2d 134 (Ct. 
App. 1997). 
What Claimant describes as her inability to prove a negative is actually indicative 
of the problems that her RADS diagnosis and why it does not fit with her overall 
theory of the case. Claimant tries to twist the opinions of Dr. Beaver in a similar 
manner and argue that since he identified certain traumatic events in her life, he relied 
on false assumptions as to her present condition. Instead, Dr. Beaver actually 
considered these events, coupled with Claimant's entire experience from the date of 
the alleged incident to the present to formulate his opinions as to how stress affects 
her personal life. 
Claimant has missed the point with respect to Dr. Beaver's opinion. Although 
Dr. Beaver concluded that a person suffering from RADS could have anxiety related 
breathing issues, he did not ultimately concur in Claimant's RADS diagnosis. To him, 
Claimant's anxiety was the prime issue, and he felt that was due to totally unrelated 
triggers than the potential exposure. Dr. Beaver identified, and the Commission rightly 
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agreed, that Claimant's emotional problems were deeply rooted in conditions in no way 
related to her alleged exposure. 
D. The Findings of Fact are Supported by the Evidence 
Claimantl s final argument upon reconsideration asked the Commission to 
reweigh the evidence with respect to a number of specific findings. Most, if not all, of 
the questions of fact identified by Claimant as errors on the part of the Referee were 
influenced heavily by Claimant's overall credibility. Claimant is asking the Commission 
to take as gospel truth selective portions of her testimony, when it was clear that 
Claimant was not the best historian, often had a skewed view of history and many 
times didn't accurately portray her condition to her medical care providers. This is 
most obvious in the errors Claimant assigned to the findings regarding her ongoing 
smoking habitl which was significant because this clearly could have an effect on her 
ability to breath. The Referee was correct to identify that Claimant was unclear about 
her smoking habits and often failed to accurately respond to her medical providers 
about her smoking status. 
Claimant attempts to argue that because many of the findings made by the 
Referee were not addressed in Defendants' initial briefing, the Referee overstepped his 
bounds by making his own conclusion. UnfortunatelYI this argument is overshadowed 
by the fact that Defendants conformed with the briefing page limits and requirements 
outline in the Judicial Rules of Practice and was forced to hit the major issues. There 
is no question that if Defendants had been afforded an additional 30 pages, these 
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questions would have been brought to light. The Referee astutely picked up on the 
fact that there were great discrepancies between Claimant's testimony at her two 
depositions and hearing about the timing of the accident. The same can be said about 
Claimant's smoking habits. 
The weight given to the various experts and their differing opinions with respect 
to the RADS diagnosis versus GERDs is again improperly raised in this stage in the 
proceedings . Dr. Fullmer was not as supportive of Claimant's case as they may lead 
the Commission to believe. Defendants objected to Claimant's attempts to elicit 
opinions from him about her current condition when asked at his deposition. He did 
not have the entire file, and in fact only had a very small portion of the record. As a 
result, it is not surprising that his testimony, although supportive of Claimant, was not 
given much weight since he obviously was not fully apprised of all of the facts. Dr. 
Carveth was also in a similar position. She even questioned Claimant's motives when 
we discussed the letters submitted by Claimant in support of her Social Security claim 
for benefits. Claimant did a disservice to herself by not providing her experts with the 
full record. Industrial Commission decisions are replete with precedent that medical 
opinions premised on incomplete, inaccurate, selective or mistaken information are 
unpersuasive, unreliable, and cannot satisfy the requisite burden of proof. Cotsford v. 
Specialty Construction Systems, 2001 IIC 0771, 0777 (2001); Santos v. Simplot, 
2000 IIC 0294, 0297 (2000); Nelson v. David L. Hill Logging, 1995 IIC 0314, 0318 
(1995); Bolkcom v. Friendly Fred's of Nampa, Inc., 1995 IIC 0070,0078 (1995); Kato 
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v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 1 991 II C 0472, 1 481 (1 991 ); Cadward v. Gem Gunite Pools, 
1987 IIC 0576,0579 (1987). 
To the contrary, Defendants' experts had access to the entire gamut of the 
medical reports, depositions and other sources of information related to Claimant's 
case. It is not surprising that the Referee came to the same conclusion as Defendants' 
experts when he was faced with the full record. The Referee experienced in person 
Claimant's presentation and a supposed reaction to perfume on a blouse borrowed 
from a family member. It was interesting to see how this alleged reaction seemed to 
wax and wane during the hearing, depending upon the source of questioning and the 
topics covered. 
The Referee had the benefit of observing Defendants' primary expert witness 
testify live at hearing. He participated in the questioning of Dr. Munday and explored 
the same themes that were addressed in the final opinion. He had available the 
impeaching documents from Claimant's Social Security file. He was able to review 
Claimant's significant post incident work as an EMT. In the end, without the benefit 
of corroborating eye-witness testimony or other similarly effected employees, the 
Referee made a judgment call, clearly within his discretion as to Claimant's credibility, 
the onset of her symptoms and the relationship of those symptoms to the incident. 
Ultimately, she was found to lack credibility. Claimant has presented no new facts or 
identified significant errors of law that warrant overturning the well-reasoned decision 
of the Referee. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Referee's October 16, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation as well as the Industrial Commission's November 3,2009, affirming 
Order are supported by substantial and competent evidence. At its basis, Claimant's 
request for reconsideration is nothing more than a plea for the Commission to re-weigh 
evidence and "think it over again" in a manner which would be wholly inconsistent 
with its prior decisions and contrary to controlling precedent. Based on the foregoing 
argument and authority, Defendants respectfully request the Industrial Commission 
deny Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
If necessary, ~ants request oral argument on the matter. 
DATED this __ day of December, 2009. 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
By: 
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IC No.: 00-030269 
CLAIMANT'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT 
TO IDAHO CODE §72-718 
COME NOW, the above-named Claimant, Lesia Knowlton, by and through her 
attorney' s of record, R. Brad Masingill and Christ T. Troupis, and submits the following Reply 
Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order entered by the 
Commission in this case on November 3, 2009. 






NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUBSTANTIATE 
THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE CLAIMANT'S 
SYMPTOMS WERE RELATED TO PRE-EXISTING GERD 
The Defendant asserts without citation to any evidence in the record that "subsequent 
testing showed that Claimant's GERD condition, even though diagnosed after the fact, had 
advanced to a stage that it had to pre-exist her alleged exposure." Def. Brief, p. 5. The 
Defendant's conclusion is contrary to all of the medical evidence in the record. 
Four months after the exposure, Leisa Knowlton's airway and vocal cords did not show 
any injury from GERD acid, which would have been present if she had severe GERD at the time 
of the exposure. Dr. Carveth Depo., p. 113, lines 21 - p. 114, line 15. 
"What significance is there, or maybe there isn't, in the clinical note assessment on page 
60, of Exhibit 1, where the statement is made, "They did not notice acid injury to her 
vocal cords"? Do you remember that? 
A: Uh-huh (Affirmative). And we discussed that a little bit. And I think in that - that was 
a - a direct visualization of her vocal cords done by the Vocal Cord clinic the day after I 
saw her. And she was having some GERD symptoms at the time, but they didn't actually 
see injury. So GERD to a significant enough degree to cause injury. 
But the acid I was discussing was GERD acid and not sulfuric acid. 
Q. Okay. If she would have had severe GERD prior to that time, would there have been 
some evidence of injury, acid injury, to her vocal cords at that time? 
A: If it was severe, I would have expected they could have seen something." 
"You said something about there was no finding of GERD in that examination by 
Marshall Smith .... what is the significance of that? 
A: Precisely what we discussed, that she had GERD symptom, but there weren't fmdings. 
So that told me GERD, if present, was probably not severe." Dr. Carveth depo., pg. 114, 
line 24. - p. 115, line 9. 
Both Drs. Fullmer and Dr. Carveth testified that the acid taste in Leisa's mouth could be 
indicative of exposure to chemical fumes. Dr. Fullmer depo., p. 16, lines 4-10; Dr. Carveth 
depo., p. 57, lines 5-8. 
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Contrary to the medically unsupported claim of Dr. Munday that undiagnosed and 
asymptomatic GERD explained Leisa Knowlton's symptoms better than her undisputed 
exposure to chemical fumes at work, every one of Leisa Knowlton's treating physicians 
concluded that her symptoms were related to toxic exposure to chemical fumes at work. 
Laira Thomas, FNP noted in her Assessment, "Cough possibly related to chemical 
exposure at work." Exh. 5, p. 13. 
Dr. Thomas Pryor's diagnostic assessment was "toxic exposure to sulfuric acid, 
accidental, with secondary bronchitis. Exh. 9, p. 5. 
Dr. Ronald Fullmer's initial diagnosis was "an inhalation injury secondary to sulfuric 
acid exposure." Exh. 2, p. 16. In his 10113/00 Assessment, he noted: "It is likely that she suffered 
some upper airway and perhaps even some laryngeal and tracheal chemical injury .... She could 
have a reactive airways dysfunction syndrome which is basically an asthma like syndrome of 
bronchospasm which may follow inhalation exposure either to smoke or chemicals." Exh. 2, p. 
10. He also testified in deposition that Lesia's odor intolerances, persistent asthma symptoms and 
laryngeal and vocal cord problems could be related to the sulfuric acid injury. He said: 
"So I think those kind of symptoms might still be related to the sulfuric acid injury." 
"Q: Right. Could GERD also cause the same symptoms and problems? 
A: Probably not." Dr. Fullmer depo., p. 45, line 9 - 14. 
Dr. Fullmer concurred with Dr. Carveth's expert opinion that Leisa Knowlton had 
acquired Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome from her exposure to chemical fumes at 
work. He testified: 
"She did see an occupational pulmonary medicine at the University of Utah also, Dr. 
Carveth, and had a pretty extensive exam there. And she, basically, it sounds like, came 
to the same conclusions, that she had Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome. And then 
also, you know, paradoxical vocal cord motion, which can pretty much mimic signs and 
symptoms of asthma. It's - and so that's the only other, as far as an expert opinion from a 
person specifically related to occupational exposures, that I'm aware of." 
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Dr. Fullmer depo, p. 47, line 14 - 24. 
Dr. Richard Henry reached the same conclusion, recorded in in his 12/27/00 note: 
"1. Reactive airways dysfunction syndrome suggested by history. At this point she seems 
to have heightened nonspecific hyperreactivity of her upper and lower airways. Although 
prior history does not suggest prior atopy, she does have a brother with asthma and hay 
fever and is therefore at higher risk for developing asthma. From her history, there 
appears to be an initial occupational contribution and now an ongoing occupational 
aggravation when exposed to hospital chemicals (disinfectants, cleaning agents, etc.) 
2. Tobacco abuse, minimal." Exh. 10, p. 2. 
Drs. Fullmer and Carveth also noted that irritation of the nose and eyes was not a 
necessary component of a chemical fume inhalation injury sufficient to cause RADS. 
"Q: Now, based upon your understanding, this was an exposure to fumes or kind of an 
aerosolized version of the chemical? 
A: Well, all she did - 1 mean, there was no description of any gas or color, you know, any 
kind of colored gas or fumes or smoke or any other kind of - basically, she described an 
odor." 
Q: Right. 
A: 1 did say fumes, but 1 don't recall that she actually described, you know, some kind of 
floating mist or anything like that. 1 think it was mostly odor. 
Q: Doctor, would you expect an exposure such as that to also have some effect on the 
eyes and nose? 
A: It could. 
Q: Would you be surprised if the effect was limited solely to the upper airway? 
A: I'm not sure that would be predictable. 1 mean, I suppose one person could have 
mostly airway symptoms and another could have mostly eye irritation or both. But I'm 
not sure it's exclusive that a person is going to have both." Dr. Fullmer depo., pg. 16, line 
22 - p. 17, line 20. 
Dr. Carver testified: 
"1 can't specifically address sulfuric acid. 1 have seen some cases come to the lCU with 
irritant exposures, significant lower respiratory inflammation without major eye, upper 
respiratory symptoms. 
Q: Okay. 
A. So that the lower airway is quite sensitive. 
Q: Okay. And That's in a situation with a lower or a minor exposure in that case? 
A: No. Probably significant." Dr. Carveth depo, p. 64, line 14 - 24. 
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LEISA KNOWLTON'S SPIROMETRY TEST RESULTS 
CORROBORATED THE RADS DIAGNOSIS 
AND EXCLUDED PRE-EXISTING ASTHMA 
OR LUNG DISEASE 
Leisa Knowlton had spirometry tests with a normal baseline lung capacity, as well as 
eleven (11) Methacholine Challenge Tests that were positive for RADS. Contrary to the defense 
claim, these spirometry test results corroborate the RADS diagnosis. A spirometry test measures 
the baseline lung capacity; then a bronchodilator is introduced to increase that capacity. In the 
presence of lung disease or asthma, the normal baseline will be reduced and the bronchodilator 
will counteract the reduction in lung capacity. Leisa Knowlton's spirometry tests showed a 
normal baseline proving that she did not have any pre-existing asthma or lung disease that would 
have reduced her baseline lung capacity. 
The Methacholine Challenge Test serves an entirely different purpose of diagnosing 
RADS in a person without pre-existing lung disease or asthma. In a Methacholine Challenge 
Test, the baseline lung capacity is established; then a Methacholine Irritant is introduced into the 
lungs. If the person has hyperreactivity to the Methacholine Irritant, a reduction in lung capacity 
will result. Leisa Knowlton had eleven (11) Methacholine Challenge Tests administered at the 
University of Utah Hospital and St. Luke's. All of them showed that when the irritant was 
introduced, her lung capacity was markedly diminished, confirming the RADS diagnosis. As Dr. 
Carveth testified: 
"RADS is an irritant reaction in the airway that's different than asthma, that includes 
inflammation, airway hyperresponsiveness, that may be long term." HC depo, p. 15, line 
6-7. 
"It's not unusual to be normal at rest. Therefore, you need the methacholine challenge 
study." Dr. Carveth depo, p. 60, line 2-7 
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THE REFEREE GAVE UNDUE WEIGHT 
TO THE OPINIONS OF DEFENSE EXPERTS 
THAT WERE WITHOUT SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION 
AND NOT BASED ON THE FACTS 
The Claimant has objected to the weight given to the GERDS' opinion of Dr. Stephen 
Munday because that opinion is not based on medical facts in the record, or any accepted 
scientific theory. The defense claims that this is a new objection raised in this motion for 
reconsideration. However, the same objection was made verbatim in the Claimant's Reply 
Memorandum in response to the Defendant's citation of Dr. Munday's opinions. At page 21 of 
the Reply Memorandum, the Claimant stated: 
"It is impossible to rebut the testimony of an expert who claims that the evidence that a 
medical condition exists is the absence of any evidence that it exists. All that we can do is 
note that there is no scientific basis for such an opinion. It does not meet the evidentiary 
standards for a medical expert opinion. It cannot be tested. It cannot be proven. It is 
therefore not scientific evidence and it should be stricken." 
In Page v Mccain Foods, 179 P.3d 265 (ID 2008), the Court held: 
"The Court may set aside an order or award by the Industrial Commission if: (1) the 
commission's findings of fact are not based on any substantial competent evidence; ... or 
(4) the findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award. I.C. § 72-732; 
Ewins v. Allied Sec., 138 Idaho 343, 345-46, 63 P.3d 469, 471-72 (2003). This Court 
exercises free review over the Commission's legal conclusions but does not disturb factual 
findings that are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Ewins, 138 Idaho at 
346,63 P.3d at 472. "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id 
On a motion for reconsideration, it is proper for the Commission to examine the evidence 
and determine whether undue weight was given to an expert opinion by the Referee, and whether 
that opinion was based on "substantial and competent evidence." Dr. Stephen Munday's opinions 
were not based on any medical evidence in the record, but entirely speculative, and contrary to 
the opinions of the treating physicians. They were therefore not entitled to any weight. 
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Similarly, Dr. Craig Beaver based his opinions on "facts" that were nowhere supported in 
the record and in fact refuted. He testified that some of Leisa Knowlton's initial anxiety and 
emotional distress were due to occurrences in her life. But the medical reports of her anxiety 
preceded any of these occurrences, making it impossible for any of them to be a component of 
her initial reports of anxiety. 
Moreover, Dr. Beaver's opinions were misstated in Finding #29, which stated: 
Finding #29. "Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D .... opined inhalation exposure was not the 
predominate cause of Claimant's symptoms initially and was not a probable cause of 
her later-appearing symptoms. 
Dr. Beaver's opinion did not cover all of Leisa Knowlton's "symptoms," either initially 
or later-appearing. His opinion was specifically limited to anxiety and emotional distress. Dr. 
Beaver was not qualified to offer a medical opinion as to whether Leisa Knowlton contracted 
RADS from her exposure, nor was he qualified to opine on the extent to which she continued to 
suffer from the physical symptoms ofRADS. Dr. Beaver did not offer any opinion on those 
issues. He only offered the opinion that there was an emotional component to her symptoms that 
accounted for "some of her breathing episodes." He testified, "She could have the most clearly 
verified physiological reactive airway disease problem where nobody would disagree that she 
had that severely, but some of the episodes that she's going to have are triggered by her 
emotions. That's just the way that disorder works." Dr. Beaver depo., p. 51, lines 4-11. 
Dr. Beaver also made the point that he was not offering an opinion on the number of 
breathing episodes that were initiated by anxiety as opposed to those initiated by her medical 
condition. He admitted that the breathing episodes could be triggered by Leisa's medical 
condition "a lot of the time." He said: 
"Well, from her perspective, she always felt that the breathing problem came on first then 
she got nervous and anxious about it. 
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And I'm not saying that couldn't be true some of the time or a lot of the time, but she 
really would not acknowledge that it ever was the other way around." Dr. Beaver depo., 
p. 50, line 20 - p. 51 , line 2. 
Contrary to Finding #29, Dr. Beaver did not opine on her physical problem at all, or the 
extent to which her emotional anxiety or medical condition was the predominate problem. Dr. 
Beaver's report offered an opinion only as to "the claimant's current psychological problems, 
disorders or conditions." His report stated: 
"b. Is the September 12,2000, alleged exposure the predominate cause as compared to all 
other causes combined of any consequences of the claimant's current psychological 
problems, disorders, or conditions? 
This is a complex question. While the 09/12/00 exposure likely contributed to her level of 
emotional distress, it occurred within the context of at least three other emotionally 
difficult factors. There was the discovery her children were being physically abused by 
her former husband and the ensuing custody battle. Additionally, in April 2001, her sister 
was killed. Then in September 2006, her brother was killed and she has taken in her 11-
year old niece to care for. The combination of these factors appear to be the cause of her 
current emotional distress as discussed above. Therefore, I do not feel the 09/12/00 
alleged exposure is the predominate cause above all other causes of her emotional 
distress, but a factor among several other factors that contributed to her current 
psychological state." Exh. 31, p. 20. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the substantial competent evidence in this case, the Claimant has met her 
burden of proof and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order should be reversed. 
Dated: December 8, 2009. 
Christ T. TroUPlS 
Attorney for Claimant 
Leisa Knowlton 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY certify that on December 8, 2009, I caused to serve a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Claimant's Reply Memorandum in support of Motion For Reconsideration in the 
above referenced case by first class u.s. mail, postage prepaid, and by electronic mail upon the 
following: 
Matthew Pappas 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On November 20, 2009, Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum 
in support, requesting reconsideration of the Industrial Commission's decision filed November 3, 
2009, in the above referenced case. Defendants filed a response on December 3, 2009, and 
Claimant filed a reply on December 9, 2009. 
At hearing, Claimant alleged that while at work she was exposed to an odor for several 
hours and suffered injury to her lungs. She has been unable to work around any odor since and 
thus, she is totally disabled as an odd lot worker. Defendants contended that Claimant was not 
injured by the odor but instead suffers from her longstanding asthma exacerbated by 
gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION - 1 
The Commission's Recommendation and Order found that the opmlOns of treating 
physician Dr. Fullmer and expert toxicologist Dr. Munday were consistent with each other, and 
established that Claimant's September 12, 2000 exposure did not cause any symptoms or 
condition which would have reasonably required medical care. The Commission concluded that 
Claimant failed to show that the symptoms for which she sought medical attention probably were 
related to the exposure to the odor she experienced on September 12,2000. The Commission did 
find Defendants liable for Claimant's initial six-week period of medical benefits as an expense of 
investigating the compensability of the claim. 
In the motion for reconsideration, Claimant argues that the Commission's decision is not 
based on substantial competent evidence, and the findings do not as a matter of law support the 
order and award. Defendants aver that Claimant is merely asking the Commission to reweigh the 
evidence and come to a different conclusion. 
A decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to 
all matters adjudicated, provided that within 20 days from the date of the filing of the decision, 
any party may move for reconsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718. However, "it is axiomatic that 
a claimant must present to the Commission new reasons factually and legally to support a 
hearing on her Motion for Rehearing/Reconsideration rather than rehashing evidence previously 
presented." Curtis v. M.ll. King Co., 142 Idaho 383,388, 128 P.3d 920 (2005). 
On reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evidence in the case, and 
determine whether the evidence presented supports the legal conclusions. The Commission is 
not compelled to make findings on the facts of the case during reconsideration. Davison v. H.H. 
Keirn Co., Ltd. , 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196. The Commission may reverse its decision upon 
a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of the decision in question, based on the arguments 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION - 2 
presented, or upon its own motion, provided that it acts within the time frame established in 
Idaho Code § 72-718. See, Dennis v.School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d 329 (2000) 
(citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410 (1988)) . 
A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual 
findings and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes issue. However, the 
Commission is not inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration simply 
because the case was not resolved in a party's favor. 
Claimant contends she contracted reactive airway disease syndrome (RADS) as a result 
of her inhalation injury. RADS is a subset or form of asthma related to a toxic irritant exposure. 
Claimant argues that she has proven the eight criteria for diagnosing RADS. Claimant points to 
facts that support her argument including the testimony of Dr. Carveth, a pulmonologist. While 
there is support for the argument, ultimately the Commission was persuaded by the opinions of 
treating Dr. Fullmer and Defendants' expert Dr. Munday that Claimant suffered from GERD. 
Claimant argues that she proved that her symptoms were related to the exposure on 
September 12, 2000 because she had no prior medical evidence establishing asthma or 
respiratory problems. While there are not many prior medical records available, Dr. Munday 
found that some cases of GERD are not always obvious until they become severe. Based on the 
medical evidence presented Drs. Fullmer and Munday diagnosed that Claimant suffers from 
GERD instead ofRADS. 
The Commission does not dispute that Claimant smelled an odor at work, but the smell 
was from an unknown substance blown by a fan from over 15 feet down a hallway. Claimant 
concluded that she had inhaled a toxic substance. Claimant's initial treating doctor opined that 
Claimant's symptoms were inconsistent with exposure to inhaled sulfuric acid. 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION - 3 
Claimant also avers that the evidence does not support the opinions of defense experts. 
While the Commission fully acknowledges that there is medical evidence to supports both 
parties in this case, the Commission found Dr. Munday's report thorough and his testimony 
persuasive. Claimant's initial complaint was for a cough, a burning sensation in her nose, and no 
mention of eye irritation. Dr. Munday explained how gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) 
was more consistent given these facts than chemical inhalation and was likely the cause of 
Claimant's cough and sensation in her lungs and throat. 
The Commission has reviewed the record with a focus on the concerns that Claimant has 
raised in the motion for reconsideration and we still feel that the facts support the decision. The 
Commission's analysis took into account all the documentary evidence and testimony and found 
that the opinions of treating physician Dr. Fullmer and expert toxicologist Dr. Munday were 
consistent with each other, and established that Claimant's September 12, 2000 exposure did not 
cause any symptoms or condition which would have reasonably required medical care. Although 
Claimant disagrees with the Commission's findings and conclusions, the Commission finds the 
decision of November 3,2009, is supported by substantial evidence in the record and Claimant 
has presented no persuasive argument to disturb the decision. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~ 
DATED this I ~ day ofJanuary, 2010. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
R.D. Maynard, Chairman 
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Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
ATTEST: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on J (j7tJ=.day of January, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING~SIDERATION was served by regular United States 
Mail upon each of the following: 
R. BRAD MASINGILL 
PO BOX 467 
WEISER, ID 83672-0467 
CHRIST T. TROUPIS 
PO BOX 2408 
EAGLE, ID 83616 
MATTHEW O. PAPPAS 
PO BOX 7426 
BOISE, ID 83707 
sb/cjh 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB No. 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130 
P. O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Telephone (208) 938-5584 
Fax (208) 938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
R. BRAD MASIN GILL, ISB No. 2083 
Attorney at Law 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone (208) 414-0665 
Fax (208) 414-0490 
Email bmasingill@hotmail.com 
Attorney for Claimant Lesia Knowlton 
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Notice of Appeal 1 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, 
FREMONT COMPENSATION INSURANCE COMPANY, AND IDAHO 
INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, and their attorneys of record: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Lesia Knowlton, hereby appeals against 
the above named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
decision of the Industrial Commission filed November 3, 2009 and the 
Order denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, filed by the 
Commission on January 14, 2010. 
2. That the Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
and the final judgment described in paragraph 1 is an appealable order 
under and pursuant to Rules 11 (d) I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Appellant 
intends to assert, are as follows: 
(a) That the findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations 
of the Referee Douglas A. Donohue and the Order entered by the 
Commission thereon are not based on substantial competent 
evidence. 
(b) That the findings do not as a matter of law support the order and 
award. 
(c) That the Claimant should be awarded all of her attorneys fees and 
costs incurred in pursuit of this claim, including attorneys fees and 
costs on appeal. 
(d) Appellant may assert other issues in addition to the foregoing. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
Notice of Appeal 2 
5. A reporter's transcript of the hearing held on June 20, 2008 was 
prepared in compressed format and filed with the Industrial Commission 
on July 15, 2008. No further reporter's transcript is requested. 
6. Appellant request and designate the following documents to be included 
in the Agency's Record on Appeal. 
(a) The Standard Agency Record of the proceedings, and the following 
additional pleadings, documents and records: 
(b) All exhibits, pre- and post hearing depositions, briefs of the parties, and 
memorandum opinions or decisions of the administrative agency. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) That there is no fee due for preparation of a reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the administrative agency has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the agency's record. 
(d) That the Appellants' filing fee has been paid; 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to §67-
1401(1), Idaho Code. 
DATED this 2yth day of January, 2010. 
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BY~ 
Christ T. Troup s 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Lesia Knowlton 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2ih day of January, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL BY LESIA KNOWLTON to be 
served upon the following person(s) in the following manner: 
[x] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Express Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Federal Express 
Matthew O. Pappas 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
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BY~~ 
Christ T. Troup 




I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby 
CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL 
FILED JANUARY 29,2010; THE ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION ENTERED 
JANUARY 14, 2010; AND THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER ENTERED 
NOVEMBER 3, 2009, RE: LESIA KNOWLTON SUPREME COURT APPEAL, herein, 
and the whole thereof. 
Dated the 29TH day of JANUARY, 2010. 
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LESIA KNOWLTON, ) 
) 
- - - Claimant-Appellant,-- - ,-- ) SUPREME COURT NO. 3 7 ~o _ n 
V. ) 
) 
WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, Employer, ) 
and FREMONT COMPENSATION ) CERTIF1CATE OF APPEAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, Surety, and ) OF LESIA KNOWLTON 
IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY ) 
ASSOCIATION, Party of Interest, ) 
) 
Defendants Respondents. ) 
--------------------------------~) 
Appeal From: Industrial Commission Chairman R. D. Maynard presiding. 
Case Number: IC 2000-030269 
Order Appealed from: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER ENTERED 
NOVEMBER 3, 2009; AND ORDER DENYING 
RECONSIDERATION ENTERED JANUARY 14,2010 
Attorney for Appellant: CHRIST T. TROUP IS 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Attorney for Respondents: MATTHEW O. PAPPAS 
P.O. Box 7426 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Boise, ID 83707 
LESIA KNOWLTON, Claimant 
WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, Employer and 
FREMONT COMPENSATION INSURANCE COMPANY, Surety 
and IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, 
Party of Interest 
JANUARY 28, 2010 
$86.00 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OFLESIAKNOWLTON-1 
Name of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
M. DEAN WILLIS, CCR 
P.O. Box 1241 
Eagle, ID 83616 
The entire standard transcript has been requested. 
_ ... The standard transcript has b~en prepared and 
is on file with the Industrial Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF LESIA KNOWLTON - 2 
Anderson, Julian & Hull 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
ORIGINAL 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
2OfO FEB - 8 , P 4: , 1 
fND' " .' REef/V'ED 
USTRI4l COMfflSSI.QI4 
Alan K. Hull, ISB No.: 1568 
Matthew O. Pappas, ISB No. 6190 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants 
Wood River Medical Center, Fremont Compensation Insurance 
Group and Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association 





WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, 
Employer, and FREMONT 
COMPENSATION INSURANCE GROUP, 
Surety, and IDAHO INSURANCE 




I.C. No. 2000-030269 
Supreme Court No. 37360 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
SUPREME COURT FILING FEE: 
$86.00 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FILING 
FEE: $100.00 
TO: THE ABOVE ENTITLED CLAIMANT, LESIA KNOWLTON AND HER 
ATTORNEYS, AND THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants, WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, 
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Employer, FREMONT COMPENSATION INSURANCE GROUP, Surety, and IDAHO 
INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Party of Interest, appeal against the above 
named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the (i) Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation and (ii) Order entered by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission on November 3, 2009 and the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration 
filed by the Commission on January 14, 2010. 
2. The party has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to Rules 11 (d), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of issues on appeal: 
(a) Does the Commission have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Idaho Code § 41-3601 et seq.? 
(b) Did the Commission err by denying the Motion to Strike Claimant's 
Post-Hearing Reply Brief? 
(c) If the commission has subject matter jurisdiction, did it err by 
failing to address and follow the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Idaho 
Code § 41-3601 et seq. ? 
4. No further transcript other than the transcript of the hearing held on June 
20, 2008 is requested. 
5. The Cross-Appellants request the following documents to be included in 
the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2 
..... -
those designated by the appellant in the initial notice of appeal: 
(a) All documents identified in the Request for Additional Records on 
Appeal filed contemporaneously herewith . 
6. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal has been served on the 
report. 
(b) That there is no fee due for preparation of a reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the administrative agency has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of any additional documents requested in the cross-appeal. 
(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this ""f:;ay of February, 2010. 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
By: 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 3 
CERTIFICATefF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of February, 2010, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL by delivering the same to each 
of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
R. Brad Masingill 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Suite 130 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Industrial Commission 
700 South Clearwater Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Idaho Supreme Court 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0020 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 4 
[~U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ 1 Hand-Delivered 
[Y Overnight Mail 
[ 1 Facsimile 
[/ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ 1 Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail v-r Facsimile 
[ -]~.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ...-1 Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[~ 
[ ..... j 
[ ] 
[ ] 




Anderson, Julian & Hull 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
Alan K. Hull, ISB No.: 1568 
Matthew O. Pappas, ISB No. 6190 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
ORIGINAL 
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WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, 
Employer, and FREMONT 
COMPENSATION INSURANCE GROUP, 
Surety, and IDAHO INSURANCE 
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Party of 
Interest, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
1. Agency's Record: 
I.C. No. 2000-030269 
Supreme Court No. 37360 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
RECORDS ON APPEAL 
a. Defendants' Exhibits admitted at the October 20, 2005 hearing: 
i. Exhibit 1 - Form 1 (DOL: 9/12/00) 
ii. Exhibit 2 - Ron Fullmer, M.D. 
iii. Exhibit 3 - Hailey Medical Clinic 
iv. Exhibit 4 - Melani Harker, M.D. 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON APPEAL - 1 
v . Exhibit 5 - Laira Thomas, F.N.P. 
vi. Exhibit 6 - Blaine County Chiropractic 
vii. Exhibit 7 - Ralph Campanale II , M.D. 
viii. Exhibit 8 - F. John Gies, M.D. 
ix. Exhibit 9 - Thomas Pryor, M.D. 
x. Exhibit 10 - Richard Henry, M .D. 
xi. Exhibit 11 - Scott Wright, D.D.S. 
xii. Exhibit 12 - Stephen Munday, M.D. 
xiii. Exhibit 13 - Magic Valley Regional Medical Center 
xiv. Exhibit 14 - Cassia Memorial Hospital 
xv. Exhibit 15 - Wood River Medical Center 
xvi . Exhibit 16 - Gooding County Memorial Hospital 
xvii. Exhibit 17 - University of Utah/Holly Carveth, M.D. 
xviii. Exhibit 18 - Social Security Administration Disability File 
xix. Exhibit 19 - Claimant's Personnel File 
xx. Exhibit 20 - Claimant's Tax Returns 
xxi. Exhibit 21 - Claimant's September 23, 2003 Deposition 
Transcript 
xxii. Exhibit 22 - Claimant's September 28, 2004 Deposition 
Transcript 
xxiii. Exhibit 23 - Jodi Alverson's March 24, 2005 Deposition 
Transcript 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON APPEAL - 2 
b. 
c. 
xxiv. Exhibit 24 - Joyce Fogg's March 24, 2005 Deposition 
Transcript 
xxv. Exhibit 25 - Karen Exon's March 24, 2005 Deposition 
Transcript 
xxvi. Exhibit 26 - Robert Morrison's March 24, 2005 Deposition 
Transcript 
xxvii. Exhibit 27 - MSDS Data Sheet 
xxviii. Exhibit 28 - Douglas Crum, CDMS 
xxix. Exhibit 29 - Mark Zuvic Deposition Transcript 
xxx. Exhibit 30 - William Wallace, M.D. 
xxxi. Exhibit 31 - Craig Beaver, Ph.D. 
xxxii. Exhibit 32 - Camas County Ambulance Run Reports 
xxxiii. Exhibit 33 - Darla Boggs' June 3, 2008 Deposition Transcript 
xxxiv. Exhibit 34 - Jenna Rovig's June 9, 2008 Deposition Transcript 
Transcripts of Post Hearing Depositions of: 
i. Holly Carveth, M.D. (8/29/08) 
ii. William Wallace, M.D. (2/27/09) 
iii. Ronald K. Fullmer, M.D. (3/16/09) 
iv. Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D. (4/9109) 
v. Doug Crum, CDMS (4/28/09) 
Claimant's Trial Brief dated June 11, 2009 
d. Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief dated June 26, 2009 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON APPEAL - 3 
•• 
e. Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief dated July 10, 2009 
f. Defendants' Motion to Strike Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief 
dated July 10, 2009 
g. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation dated 
October 16, 2009 and filed November 3, 2009 
h. Order dated/filed November 3, 2009 
I. Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support 
dated November 19, 2009 
j. Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration dated 
December 3, 2009 
k. Order Denying Reconsideration dated/filed January 14, 2010 
2. I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the clerk of the 
administrative agency and upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20.& 
DATED this ~ day of February, 2010. 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
By: 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON APPEAL - 4 
• 
CERTIFICAT~ SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this cj day of December, 2010, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS'/RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIIONAL 
RECORDS ON APPEAL by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
R. Brad Masingill 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Suite 130 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Industrial Commission 
700 South Clearwater Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Idaho Supreme Court 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0020 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON APPEAL - 5 
[~U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ J, Overnight Mail 
[./] Facsimile 
[ ~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[~ Facsimile 
[ Y U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ /] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 










I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby 
CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the NOTICE OF CROSS-
APPEAL filed February 8, 2010; and the REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON 
APPEAL filed February 8, 2010, RE: LESIA KNOWLTON SUPREME COURT 
APPEAL, herein, and the whole thereof. 
CERTIFICATION 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB No. 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130 
P. O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Telephone (208) 938-5584 
Fax (208) 938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
R. BRAD MASINGILL, ISB No. 2083 
Attorney at Law 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone (208) 414-0665 
Fax (208)414-0490 
Email bmasingill@hotmail.com 
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, 
FREMONT COMPENSATION INSURANCE COMPANY, AND IDAHO 
INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, and their attorneys of record: 
1. In her Notice of Appeal, the Appellant, Lesia Knowlton , has requested 
that all pre-and post hearing depositions be included in the Agency's 
Record on Appeal. 
2. Respondents/Cross-Appellants have designated some of the post 
hearing depositions in their Request for Additional records on appeal. 
3. The following post hearing depositions should also be included in the 
Agency's Record on Appeal : 
a) Barbara K. Nelson, MS, CRC (12/31/08) 
b) Shauna Gorringe (6/18/07) 
c) Jason Gorringe (6/18/07) 
d) Mike Stewart (6/18/07) 
e) Barbara Wentzel (6/18/07) 
f) Shari Rumple (6/18/07) 
g) Connie Jacobson (6/19/07) 
h) Frances Hobbs (6/19/07) 
i) Bobbie Hobbs (6/19/07) 
j) Lynn Jacobson (6/19/07) 
k) Deanna Hoskinson (6/19/07) 
I) Dawn Ingersoll (6/19/07) 
m) Rhonda Henderson (6/19/07) 
n) May Heacock (6/19/07) 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS 
ON APPEAL 2 
0) David T. Knowlton (9/17/08) 
p) Warren Dan Gorringe (9/17/08) 
q) Jay Brown (11/25/08) 
4. I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the clerk of the 
administrative agency and upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 16th day of February, 2010. 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS 
ON APPEAL 3 
BY~ 
Chrrst T. Trou s 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Lesia Knowlton 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of February, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Supplemental Request for Additional Records on Appeal 
to be served upon the following person{s) in the following manner: 
[x] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Express Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Federal Express 
Matthew O. Pappas 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
R. Brad Masingill 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0020 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS 
ON APPEAL 4 
BYCh~~ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Lesia Knowlton 
CERTIFICATION 
I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby 
CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the SUPPLEMENTAL 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON APPEAL filed February 17, 2010, RE: 
LESIA KNOWLTON SUPREME COURT APPEAL, herein, and the whole thereof. 
CERTIFICATION 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Jan Cottrell, the undersigned Assistant Secretary ofthe Industrial Commission, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and 
papers designated to be included in the Clerk's Record on appeal by Rule 28(3) of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b). 
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly 
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court after the Record is 
settled. 
omell 
. starlt ·Commt~sibn' Secretary 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD - LEISA J KNOWLTON - 37360-1 
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WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, 
Employer, and FREMONT 
COMPENSATION INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Surety, and IDAHO 
INSURANCE GUARANTY 
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) 
) 









TO: Steven Kenyon, Clerk of the Courts; and 
Christ T. Troupis for the Appellants; and 
Matthew O. Pappas for the Respondent. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and, 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been served 
by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
CHRIST T TROUPIS 
POBOX2408 
EAGLE ID 83616-9116 
MATTHEW 0 PAPPAS 
POBOX7426 
BOISE ID 83707 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - LEIS A J KNOWLTON - 37360 - 1 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the Clerk's 
Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. fu the 
event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the twenty-eight 
day period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho, this I"" day of March, 2010. 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - LEISA J KNOWLTON - 37360 - 2 
